Muhammad Ataul Gani Osmani (Bengali: মুহাম্মদ আতাউল গনি ওসমানী; 1 September 1918– 16 February 1984), also known as Bongobir (the Hero of Bengal), was the founding leader of the Bangladeshi military. He was the Commander-in-Chief of all Bangladeshi forces during the Liberation War in 1971. He was the Minister of Defence in the Provisional Government of Bangladesh. After the war, he became a general of the Bangladesh Army.
Osmani had a career spanning three decades, beginning with service in the British Indian Army in 1939. He fought in Burma during World War II and served in the Pakistan Army until 1967. Osmani earned a reputation as a fierce, honest and principled advocate of Bengali aspirations in the West Pakistani-dominated military of Pakistan.
Following Bangladeshi independence, Osmani joined politics and was a cabinet minister in the government of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. He resigned from the government after opposing the creation of the one party state of BAKSAL.

Early life and education

Muhammad Ataul Gani Osmani was born to a landed family in Sunamganj, British India on 1 September, 1918. He was a descendant of Shah Nizamuddin Osmani, an associate of Hazrat Shah Jalal during the 14th century. The Osmani ancestral village is located in Dayamir in Balaganj upazila.
Osmani initially attended the Cotton School in Sylhet. He matriculated from the Sylhet Government Pilot School in 1934 with first division marks. He won the Pritoria Prize for excellent grades in English.^[1] Osmani studied geography in Aligarh Muslim University and graduated in 1938. He enrolled as a Gentleman Cadet in the British Indian Military Academy in 1939.

Military career

Upon joining the British Indian Army, Osmani was inducted into the 4th Urban Infantry from 1939 to 1940.^[1] He was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant artillery officer in October 1940. He was initially attached to the 2nd Battalion, Duke of Wellington's Regiment, posted in New Delhi in charge of a depot.^[2] After completion of Short Mechanical Transport Course (November 1940 - February 1941) and Junior Tactical Course ( February 1941 - April 1941), Lt. Osmani was attached to a Mechanical Transport Battalion, part of the XV Corps (British India) and was posted in Burma during World War II.^[3]

British Indian Army 1941 - 1947

Osmani was promoted to the rank of temporary Captain in February 17, 1941 and received a battlefield promotion to temporary Major in 23 May 1942 and at the age of 23, he was the youngest officer to hold that rank in the British Indian Army for some time. Between 1941 and 1945, he successively held the post of Platoon Commander, Battalion Adjutant, Company 2IC and finally Battalion commander of his unit. From November 1944 to February 1945 Major Osmani served as General Staff Officer Grade-2 (GSO-2) in his formation HQ and completed the Senior Officers Course after the War ended.^[4]
Major Osmany was attached to British Indian Army HQ Bihar and Orissa Area as DAG-GSO-2 from May 1946 to July 1946 before he was sent to attend the Special Senior Officer's course, passing out in February 1947 and was selected as a candidate for promotion to Lieutenant Colonel.^[5] His next posting was at Simla and New Delhi in the British Indian Army GHQ in Simla in the Quarter Master General Branch and Ordnance Branch until August 1947 as GSO-2 (General Staff Office, Second Grade). From August to October 6, 1947 as GSO-2 in the HQ of Field Marshal Claude Auchinleck in New Delhi. Osmany had taken the Indian Civil Service examination as per his father's wishes and passed, but turned down an opportunity for serving in the Indian Foreign service in 1947, opting to stay in the Pakistan Army.^[5]
As the British Empire dissolved with the birth of two nations of India and Pakistan in 1947, Osmany witnessed the end of the British Indian army as an active organization. He represented Pakistan during the division of British Indian Army assets between the two emerging countries - India & Pakistan.^[6]

Career in the Pakistani Army

After the birth of India and Pakistan in 1947 following the departure of the Lord Mountbatten, Governor General of British India, Osmany joined the newly formed Pakistan Army on 7 October 1947 and was soon promoted to the rank of acting Lieutenant Colonel. Being a career experienced officer and having served in World War II, he was immediately assigned to the General Staff Headquarters as GSO-1, Coordination, Planning and Personnel.^[4]
Osmai obtained the rank of temporary Lt. Col. on January 7, 1948 and attended the Long Term Staff Course at the Quetta Staff College. He served alongside (then) Major Yahya Khan, Major Tikka Khan, and Major A. A. K. Niazi, all of whom ironically were destined to lead the Pakistan army against the Bangladesh Forces commanded by Osmany in 1971. After completing his P.S.C. Degree Osmain joined the staff of Maj. General Reginald Hutton (Chief of Staff, Pakistan Army 1947 -51) as GSO-1 in January 1949, and as a Committee Chairman tasked by General Douglas Gracey to evaluate the basic standard for Army enlistment, recommended the establishment of Cadet Colleges in East Pakistan.^[5] Osmany later took on the responsibility of Assistant Adjutant General as well.

Joining the Infantry Arm

After serving as a staff officer for eight years, Osmany decided to join the infantry arm of the army. He took a reversion to the rank of Major and after induction training, joined the 5/14 Punjab He was posted as 2IC and Company commander (5th Punjab Battalion of 14th Punjab Regiment), which was then part of a brigade commanded by Brigadier Ayub Khan, in 1950. He became commander of 105th Brigade Training Team in January 1951, and became the OC or 5/14 Punjab in May 1951, after which he did a tour of duty in Kashmir and Waziristan for four months.^[4]^[7]
Lt. Col. Osmany had a heated argument with the Commander Chief of the Pakistan army, Gen. Ayub Khan,^[8] over the treatment of Maj. Gen. Ishfakul Majid, the seniormost Bengali officer in Pakistan Army who had been falsely implicated in the Rawalpindi Conspiracy and forced to resign.^[9] This incident may have impacted his career. In August 1951 Osmany left 5/14 Punjab, and was posted as the third CO of 1st East Bengal Regiment (first Bengali to hold this post) in October 1951.^[10]

Tour of duty in East Pakistan (1950–1956)

Lt Col Osmany arrived in East Pakistan by sea and joined as CO of 1st East Bengal Regiment, then stationed in Jessore as partof the 107th Brigade, on 8 November 1951. Osmany was a hard taskmaster as CO of 1 EBR, setting up a tough training regime for the battalion, aiming to get the soldiers in top physical shape and the highest level of skill possible. He implemented some fundamental changes that were to have a far-reaching effect on the character of the regiment and on his career path.
He chose Bengali songs as the regimental marching and band songs ("Chal Chal Chal" by Kazi Nazrul Islam, "Gram Chara oi ranga matir path" by Rabindranath Tagore and Dhano Dhaney Pushpay Bhora by D.L. Roy), and introduced the Bratachari dance (introduced by Guru Shodoy Dutt) as the regimental dance.^[11] He also ordered the NCOs to submit the daily situation report in Bangla.^[12] These obvious displays of Bengali culture did not sit well with the Punjabi top brass,^[13] who were irked by this adoption of what was in their view Hindu culture.^{[citation needed]} Osmany characteristically stuck to his guns, and stubbornly carried through the said reforms after the GHQ approved his suggestions. In doing this, he repeatedly clashed with the Punjabi chauvinists, and began gaining reputation as a hard-nosed, stubborn officer with Bengali nationalistic inclinations.^{[citation needed]} In addition, Osmany also served as Commandant of East Bengal Regimental Center in Chittagong from February 1953 to January 1955.
Osmany also commanded the 107th Brigade in Jessore from April 1953 to October 1953, when he received the permanent rank of Major, and rejoined 1 EBR as CO and remained in that post until February 1954. After completion of the GHQ Law course and leaving EBRC, he was temporarily posted as Additional Commandant (Later Deputy Director) of East Pakistan Rifles in March 1955, serving under the Provincial Government of East Bengal.^[12] While in the EPR, he played a crucial role in opening up EPR recruitment for non-Bengali minority people (Chakma, Mogh, Tripura peoples, etc.) and stopped the recruitment people from West Pakistan in EPR.^[14]

Last post: Staff Officer GHQ Pakistan

Due to Osmany's superior OER (Officer Evaluation Report) the rank of Lieutenant Colonel came sooner than later. From December 1955 to May 1956 as GSO-1 staff officer he worked Senior advisor at CENTO Headquarters in Bagdad as part of the Pakistan Military delegation. Osmany was promoted to Acting Colonel in May 1956 and joined the Pakistan Army GHQ at Rawalpindi in West Pakistan as Deputy Director Military Operations (DDMO).^[4] From August 1957to September 1957 he was the Officiating Director of Military Operations as Acting Brigadier, and until May 1966 he served as the DDMO. He received the permanent rank of Colonel in 1961 and attended Advanced Modern Weapons training in the United States in 1964. Colonel Osmany had served under (then) Brigadier Gul Hassan Khan in 1964, when he was the DDMO and Gul Hassan was the DMO. Although Brigadier Hasan was Osmani 's junior, he held the senior post. Hasan had given a good confidential report about Osmany, and felt that Osmany was not given promotion despite having some excellent qualities. Gul Hassan allowed Osmany time to concentrated on issues concerning the Bengal regiments, partly to keep him occupied and partly because the top brass was bypassing Osmany.^[15]
By 1958 Osmany held the post of Deputy Director of the general staff and subsequently deputy director of military operations (DDMO) under Major General Yahya Khan and held that post until his retirement eight years later. During the first decade of his career he had reached the rank of Colonel, during the next decade Osmany was not destined to get a single promotion. During his attachment in the General Staff Branch as Deputy Director of Military Operations and Plans, Col. Osmany as additional duty attended the meetings of CENTO SEATO and Air Defense Committee of Pakistan as Pakistan Army advisor.^[16]

Bengali soldier recruitment bottleneck

Pakistan was left with 6 infantry divisions and one armored brigade after the division of the British Indian army in 1947, although none of these formations were fully equipped or staffed at that time. The number of Bengali officers and soldiers in the newly formed Pakistan armed forces was small due to the British preference to recruit from so called Martial Races, and because many non Muslim Bengali personnel had opted to join the Indian Army after the British left. Pakistan army had raised only two battalions of East Bengal Regiment during 1947-1950, while a number of Punjab Regiments had been inherited from the British Indian Army. The Azad Kashmir Regiment was created soon after the Indo-Pakistan 1948 war.
When Osmani joined the GHQ in 1956, 3 East Bengal regiments and the East Bengal Regimental Centre (EBRC) had come into existence within the structure of the Pakistan army. During the next 9 years, the number of Punjab Regiments (reorganized in 1956) reached almost 50, the Frontier Force Regiments (created 1957) and Baluch Regiments (created in 1957) were reaching the mid-40s, while the Azad Kashmir regiment was numbering in the 40s. Only 6 East Bengal Regiments had been created during the same time span. The reasons for this situation were:

Many senior officers of the Pakistan army still believed in the Martial Race theory, and considered Bengalis to be poor soldier material.^[17]^[18]
The Bengali recruits were generally of smaller build than the West Pakistanis, and many failed to meet the then established minimum physical requirement of a recruit, which was set on average West Pakistani physical characteristics.^[17]
Many Pakistani officers favored creating mixed regiments instead of purely Bengali ones. Some Pakistani officers felt that increasing the number of exclusive Bengali formations was a threat to the unity of the army.^[19]

Pakistani officers not swayed by the above facts were skeptical about the adaptability of Bengali soldiers in West Pakistani environment, where the bulk of Pakistani forces were concentrated according to the Pakistani strategy: Defence of East Pakistan lies in the West. The neglect of East Pakistan defence infrastructure was another bone of contention between Osmani and the Pakistani High command. In 1965 the Pakistani Army had 13 infantry and 2 armoured divisions in service, but only 1 under-strength infantry division was based in East Pakistan. Osmany fought with his seniors on these issues and was sidelined as a result.

Role in the 1965 War

Osmany was sidelined by Pakistani Generals despite being the DDMO during the 1965 war. Having almost nothing to do, he dedicated his time to issues regarding the East Bengal Regiments. He complained that Pakistan Press were suppressing the contributions of his old unit, 1st Bengal, posted at Kasur during the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965,.^[20] Successive COs (both Bengali and non-Bengali) of 1 EBR had built on the foundation Osmany had laid, and the battalion, under the command of Lt. Col. A.T.K. Haque (Bengali), won a total of 17 gallantry awards (including two Sitara-i-Jurat and 9 Tamgha-i-Jurat), the highest number of awards won by any Pakistan Armed Force unit engaged in that conflict. Osmany visited the unit and recommended Nishan-i-Haider for a member, and he was reportedly furious when the battalion CO declined to support his recommendation.^[21] However, he arranged reunions for Bengal regiments alumni, and took every opportunity to enhance the reputation of Bengali units in the Pakistan army. His hard core principles, his fierce loyalty and integrity, and determination to improve the standards of all Bengali personnel in the Pakistan army and his willingness to take on anyone who differed with him earned him quite a degree of honor and prestige.
After the 1965 he chaired the committee tasked with determining the required Army reserve and logistical requirement in possible future conflicts, and from the last half of 1965 to April 1966 he was the President of Army Sports Control Board. On 16 May 1966 he went on leave prior to retirement (LPR). Osmany's successor as DDMO was (then) Col. Rao Farman Ali - another person destined for infamy in Bangladesh in 1971. Farman was reportedly horrified upon seeing how Osmani was treated in the Pakistan army. His office was totally run down, Osmani was kept out of the loop and purposefully neglected, even the office help treated him with disdain. Osmany had not been promoted because he was a Bengali and was deemed untrustworthy by the high command.^[22]

Retirement and continued influence

Col. Osmani retired from Pakistani Armed Forces on 16 February 1967. Although his efforts had failed to increase the number of Bengal regiments, Pakistani High command, upon the recommendation of Lt. General Khwaja Wasiuddin, had put the existing regiments through a battery of exercises in West Pakistan to test their adaptability and combat readiness. Maj. Gen. Shaikh, evaluator of the exercises, had commented that the Bengali units had performed superbly and the proud Bengali soldiers took in representing East Pakistan was one key component of their success. He recommended against disbanding the units and raising mixed regiments.
Pakistani high command did not increase the number of Bengali units until after 1968, when following a pledge by General Yahya Khan, the number of Bengal regiments were increased to 10 and all new units were ordered to ensure at least 25% Bengali representation among the annual new recruits of the army.^[23] Osmani, known as Papa Tiger continued to enjoy a positive, revered image among the serving Bengali rank and file in the Pakistan armed forces during his retirement, mainly because of his role in standing up for Bengali soldiers. Although he was not the most senior among Bengali officers (Major General Ishfakul Majid -commissioned after passing out of Sandhurst in 1924 holds this honor) nor did he reach the highest rank in the Pakistani army among Bengalis (Lt. General Khwaja Wasiuddin holds that distinction), Osmani, along with Lt. General Wasiuddin (Colonel Commandant EBR) and Brig. M.H. Mozumdar (Commandant EBRC) were seen as the patron and guide for Bengali troops.^[24]

Entry into politics

Col. Osmani was not directly involved in the Agartala Conspiracy Case. The people involved had sought his opinion through (then) Captain Khandker Nazmul Huda (Accused No 27, later Sub Sector Commander in BDF in 1971, Colonel in Bangladesh Army in 1975) and Osmani had recommended a political, not armed solution for the discrimination faced by Bengalis in Pakistan.^[25] ISI had questioned Osmani in 1958 before the trials began on the issues related to the case.^[26] Osmani was neither arrested or implicated although the official charge sheet documented that the accused had contacting him and Osmani had attended a meeting as a "listener".

Awami League Candidate

After his retirement, Osmani entered politics of East Pakistan. He joined the Sheikh Mujib Pakistan Awami League in 1970. As a candidate from Awami League, he contested the election from the Balagaung-Fenchugaung area in Sylhet and he was elected as a member of the national assembly of the country. Osmani was not destined to serve as a MNA in the Pakistan assembly because after the commencement of Bangladesh War of Independence, he became a member of the Bangladesh Provisional government.

Leadership during Bangladesh War of Independence

Operation Searchlight: Location of Pakistani and Bengali units on 25th March 1971. Some unit locations are not shown.

Col. (ret.) Osmani and Maj. Gen. (ret.) Majid formed part of the team that advised the Awami League leadership on military issues during 1971. As the political crisis deepened in March, many serving Bengali officers of the Pakistan Armed Forces began looking to Bengali politicians for guidance, and Col. Osmani was selected as the coordinator of these clandestine meetings. Bengali Military officers (both retired and serving), alarmed by the buildup of Pakistani forces apprehensive about their own fates,^[27]^[28]^[29] and maintained contact with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman^[30] and some contacted Col. Osmany for advice and guidance and to maintain a link with Awami League leaders. Osmany reportedly agreed to coordinate the activities of various Bengali units^[31] but toeing the party line, advised all officers against taking any "rash" actions.^[29] Brig. M.R. Mazunder (Martiaal Law Administrator Chittagong area), Lt. Col Rezaul Jalil (CO 1st EBR) were all given the same message. The Pakistan Awami League pursued the course of non cooperation, preferring a political solution, and refused to sanction a preemptive strike. Sheikh Mujib was hard bent on his main principle, the unity of Pakistan. Osmani saw no other alternative, went underground.

Planned Preemptive Strike

In the days prior to the crackdown student and youth wings of Awami League had set up training camps countrywide and trained volunteers with the aid of Bengali Ansars/Mujahids and student cadets. Air of “independence” was in full flow, despite the fact that Awami League leadership had refrained from declaring independence on March 7, 1971 or later. Bengali ex-servicemen of Pakistan Armed forces had also held rallies to declare their support for Independence. Serving Bengali officers and troops also kept in touch with the political situation on the ground and unfolding around East Pakistan which was already becoming uncertain and confrontational. Maj. Gen (retired) Ishfakul Majid and Col (ret.) M.A.G Osmani allegedly designed a military plan of action, which broadly was:^[32]

Capture Dhaka airport and Chittagong seaport to seal off the province.
EPR and Police to capture Dhaka city aided by Awami League volunteers.
Cantonments were to be neutralized by Bengali soldiers.

Bengali officers had advised the sabotage of fuel dumps at Narayanganj and Chittagong to ground Pakistani air power and cripple armed force mobility.
Awami League leadership opted to try for the political solution^[32] and did not endorse any action or preparation for conflict by Bengali soldiers prior to the start of the crackdown. Warnings by Bengali officers that the Pakistan army was preparing to strike were ignored, junior Bengali officers were told by their seniors not to act rashly and keep out of political issues.
Despite all the political filibustering, public fanfare and alleged preparation for armed struggle, Pakistani army caught the Bengali political leadership and Bengali soldiers flatfooted. The resistance Pakistanis encountered country wide once Operation Searchlight was launched was spontaneous and disorganized, not a preplanned coordinated military response under a central command structure. Almost the entire Pakistan Awami League leadership fleed and escaped to Calcutta, India. In most cases Bengali soldiers were unaware of the situation around the country, many units continued to perform routine duties as late as March 31 and rebelled only after they came under Pakistani attack. Some Pakistani generals suggested declaring a general amnesty for Bengali troops upon observing the situation as early as March 31 (it was ignored).^[33] Although warned of the departure of Yahia Khan and the movement of Pakistani troops, the declaration of independence by Major Ziaur Rahman on March 26 was given after the attack had commenced and was largely unnoticed (ironically Pakistanis picked it up).^[34] No countrywide communication reached Bengali soldiers to start the uprising, Bengali troops and officers took the initiative to rebel upon being attacked or hearing the news of the Pakistani attack.

Role in Bangladesh Liberation War

Col. Osmany was present at the house of Sheikh Mujib when Bengali officers informed Awami League leaders of the departure of Yahia Khan and army movement.^[35] After failing to persuade Sheikh Mujib to go into hiding, Osmani himself hid in Dhaka until March 29, shaved off his famous mustache (he was often called the man attached to a mustache)^[36] then made for the Indian border. Osmani first went to Jingira, then to Daudkandi via boat. He was detained by local people in Daudkandi, who were suspicious of him, before the brother of the local member of parliament helped him to get free.^[37] He then walked, took boat and crossed the Gomoti with the help of another Bengali officer who was with Army Signal Corps^[38] to reach India by 2 April 1971.

Meetings at Teliapara

Col. Osmani arrived at Teliapara, where 2nd and 4th East Bengal Regiments (EBR) had established a temporary base accompanied by Brig. Panday of BSF on April 2, 1971. A meeting of Bengali Officers took place on April 4, which was attended by (then) Lt. Col (ret.) M.A Rab, Maj. K.M. Shafiullah (CO 2 EBR), Maj. Khaled Musharraf (CO - 4 EBR), Ziaur Rahman (CO - 8 EBR), Lt. Col Salahuddin Reza, Major (ret) Qazi Nurujjaman, Major Shafat Jamil and other officers. Chaired by Col. Osmani, The following was discussed:

Col. Osmani proposed that 2nd and 4th EBR attack and occupy Comilla, and asked Major Jaman to formulate a fireplan. This was opposed by other officers on the ground that the battalions would probably suffer crippling losses, and was ultimately dropped.^[39]
Major Zia proposed that all available forces should be assembled around Chittagong to hold the area as long as possible. This was also discussed and dropped as this was not a practical suggestion.^[40]
At the suggestion of Brig. Panday, the commanders agreed to send 2 companies (one from 2 EBR and one from 4 EBR) to help the battered 8th EBR under Ziaur Rahman.

Col Osmani designated 4 Sector Commanders: Maj. Ziaur Rahman (Chittagong area), Maj. Khaled Musharraf (Comilla), Maj. K M Shafiullah (Sylhet) and Maj. Abu Osman Chowdhury (Kushtia-Jessore).. He also appointed Lt. Col. Salahuddin Reza as the Sector Commander for Mymensingh Area,^[41] and on April 7 instructed Major Q.N. Jaman to oversee operations in Sylhet.^[42] The officers agreed a government in exile should be formed from political leaders and the Bengali forces should be placed under its authority. Col Osmani visited Mukti Bahini positions in Sylhet, on April 9 he visited Captain Aziz with 2 EBR Charlie Company near Sylhet.^[43] On the same day another conference took place, this time attended by Brig. Panday and Director General Rustomji of BSF, in addition to Bengali officers. The issues discussed included:

Col. Osmani was elected as the commander of Bengali forces.^[44]
Agreement was reached with India officers on logistical assistance for Bengali forces
The need to form a Government in exile was agreed on, as was the fact that this should be formed by the political leadership. This was crucial for international reorganization and would prevent coining the struggle as a military revolt.^[40] The conference abruptly broke up when Col. Osmani left after hearing that 5 PAF jets were inbound.^[45]^[46] The following day 3 more sector commanders were chosen: Maj. Nazmul Huq (Rajshahi-Pabna), Captain Nawajish (Rangpur-Dinajpur) and Captain Jalil (Barisal).^[47] Pakistan Army appointed Lt. Gen. A.A.K Niazi GOC East Pakistan on the same day. On April 12, Bengali Government in Exile at Agartola formlly appointed Col. Osmani Commander of Bangladesh Forces. With the formation of Bangladesh government on 17 April 1971, retired Colonel Osmani was reinstated to active duty under the authority of Bangladesh government and appointed as Commander-in-Chief of all Bangladesh Forces.

Initial Activities as the Commander-in-Chief

Operation Searchlight: Pakistan army operation April 10 - June 19. Not to exact scale and some troop movements/location are indicative only.

General Osmani did not assume personal command of the Bangladesh Forces until after April 17, 1971. The existing Bengali fighting formations were located far away from each other, and lacking a proper command staff and more importantly a fully integrated communication network, exercising real-time command over the widely spread formations was impossible. Osmani instead chose to allow the designated sector commanders to fight on as they saw fit, while he toured the designated sectors, and met with Indian officials in New Delhi and Kolkata. He conferred Tajiuddin and along with spoke to Indian authorities on two points only. The two principle points were weapons and communications. Supplying weapons, ammunition and adequate communications gear was and remains the most expensive trade in any military. To the poorly equipped Indian army in 1971, such a notion was hardly affordable. The Indian officials with its meager resources had to deny any requests for weapons or communications. Furthermore communication supplies resulting in unaccounted for status would result in a serious problem. Indian army planners had very little idea or training on tough terrains of Bangladesh, which was just devastated by a severe cyclone. General Osmani along with most of his senior command staff was very knowledgeable and well trained obviously having served in East Pakistan. The Indian army inquired about Osmani's plans, understood the outlined the situation in Bangladesh, had assisted to organize the Bangladesh Forces structure and sounded out the possibility of open Indian intervention the ripe moment.
The Bengali resistance had put up an unexpected stiff resistance and had managed to derail the initial Pakistani estimate of pacifying East Pakistan by April 10. However, the initial successes were not sustainable as the Bengali forces began to suffer from lack of trained men, officers, coordination among scattered troops and the lack of central command structure, proper supplies (despite limited aid from BSF), although majority of the country was still outside Pakistani control. Pakistani army had airlifted the 9th and 16th infantry division to Bangladesh by April 10 and was poised to seize the initiative. Gen. Niazi, obtaining a brief from Gen. Raza (the departing GOC East Pakistan), implemented the following strategy:^[48]

Clear all the big cities of insurgents and secure Chittagong.
Take control and open all river, highway and rail communication network.
Drive the insurgents away from the interior of the country
Launch combing operations across Bangladesh to wipe out the insurgent netweok.

Against this strategy Bengali field commanders opted to go with holding as much area for as long as possible,^[49] The Bengali political leadership hoped to keep he Pakistanis confined into the cities, while the government in exile sought diplomatic recognition and the resistance prepared for guerrilla warfare^[50] and awaited the expected of Indian military intervention.^[51] Lacking everything except unskilled volunteers, Mukti Bahini fought a conventional battle against an enemy enjoying superiority in number of trained men, firepower, and complete air superiority and played to the strength of Pakistanis. Choosing to attack Bengali forces all over Bangladesh simultaneously, Gen. Niazi concentrated battalion and brigade size forces on company and battalion size defense positions repeatedly, used air strikes and artillery barrages disregarding civilian safety, employed Heli-borne troops to outflank positions and hammered through to reach chosen objectives. Pakistani troop convoys were repeatedly ambushed, but these only delayed the Pakistani advance temporarily. By Mid May, Pakistani forces had regained control of most of the province, and by mid June, the battered remnants of the Bengali forces had been driven across the border into India.

Indian involvement

The main reason Generals Farman and Yakub had opposed any military action against civilians in East Pakistan was the fear of an Indian attack,^[52] which the Pakistan army was woefully unprepared to meet in March 1971. After the crackdown, Tajuddin Ahmed met with Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on April 3, 1971 and asked for all possible aid,^[53] by which time the Indian government had already opened East Pakistan border and the BSF was offering limited aid to the Bengali resistance. The issue of direct military intervention was discussed between the Indian military and political leadership in April 1971.^[54] The case for intervention was based on the following:

Until April 10, most of Bangladesh was outside Pakistani control, and the troops were bottled up in a few cities and was facing fierce resistance.^[55]^[56] It is likely the Indian army, with proper air support, could have quickly taken control of most of the province by aiding the Mukti Bahini.
Indian Eastern Naval contingent (1 aircraft carrier and several warships)^[57] could have imposed a blockade of the province and cut off supplies from the sea, as the Pakistan Naval arm in the east only contained 1 destroyer and 4 gunboats.
Pakistani forces were flying in crucial reinforcements from West Pakistan during March 26 – May 2^[58] and were dependent of the supply depots located in Dhaka, Chittagong, and Narayanganj for fuel and ammunitions. Most Pakistani garrisons were cut off from each other and reliant on supplies through airlifts. The Indian Air Force, vastly outnumbering the Pakistan Air Force Eastern contingent, could have cutoff the air-links and destroyed the supply depots (as it did in December 1971).

Against this, the military leadership had to consider the following:^[59]

Indian army a suitable force available for action in April 1971, and had to assemble one from forces deployed in other areas for such an operation.^[60] Could an adequate force be put in place without jeopardizing the security of the northern and western borders of India in time to make a difference in East Pakistan?
Could a logistical network be established around East Pakistan to support the combat force before Pakistani army took over the province?
Should the Indians fail to gain a quick victory, was the army and the government ready (logistically and otherwise) for a long war, especially during the monsoon season in Bangladesh?^[61]
Intervening in East Pakistan would make India the aggressor in International circles. Was India ready to diplomatically meet the international reaction and had India ensured the cooperation of a superpower as a diplomatic ally and arms supplier, crucial for running a long war?

Although some of the Bengali leadership hoped for and expected an Indian military operation at the earliest,^[62] a view also shared by some Indian officers, Indian army eastern command decided in the present condition such a move was unadvisable, and a full attack could only take place after November 15 at the earliest, after deliberate and extensive preparations,^[54] which was further elaborated to the Indian cabinet by Gen. Sam Manekshaw.^[63] Indian leadership decided not to directly ‘’intervene’’, but chose to get ‘’involved’’: Eastern command took over responsibility for East Pakistan operations on April 29, and on May 15 launched Operation Jackpot, a full-fledged operation to arm, train, equip, supply and advice the Mukti Bahihi fighters engaged in guerrilla warfare against the Pakistan armed forces. As an Indian diplomat commented to General Osmani, expecting direct Indian armed intervention in April was not practical.^[62]

Rebuilding the Bangladesh Force (BDF)

The Kaiser Willys Jeep Wagon used by Osmani to visit the war fronts during the war.

During the period of April–June, General Osmani was busy with touring the various areas in an effort to boost morale and gather information, meeting with his Indian counterparts and setting up the Bangladesh forces command structure. The Indian army had taken over supplying the Mukti Bahini since May 15 and launched Operation Jackpot to equip, train, supply and advise Mukti Bahini. By mid June, Bengali fighters had been driven into India and was in the process of setting up infrastructure to run a sustained, coordinated guerrilla campaign. Bengali high command had begun to rebuilt and redeploy Mukti Bahini units since mid May,^[64] and now began to tackle the task in earnest. During June –July, Mukti Bahini activity slacked off and the quality and effect of the insurgency was timid and poor.^[65]
The task of planning and running the war was enormous, much more so because of the acute shortage of trained officers in the surviving Bengali forces. Of the 17,000 active duty Bengali soldiers (Army and EPR) who faced the Pakistani onslaught on March 25, 1971, about 4000 became prisoners,^[66] and casualties had reduced the number of available trained personnel even further. Retired servicemen and new trainees had boosted that ranks somewhat, but further training and recruiting was needed to achieve the maximum possible results. Having lost the initial conventional war, but having secured Indian support and set up an infrastructure to run the war, the next step for the Mukti Bahini commanders was to come up with a comprehensive strategy with clearly defined roles and goals - something that also involved creating a substantial guerrilla force from scratch.
The July 10–15 sector commanders conference was to provide much needed guidance in this regard. The conference was chaired by Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmed and coordinated by Gen. Osmani, and took place at 8, Theater Road, HQ of the Bangladesh Government in exile.

Resignation

Col. Osmani was not present during the first day of the conference -he had resigned as CIC Bangladesh forces the previous day.^[67] A group of Bengali officers had discussed an idea about creating a War Council, with Maj. Ziaur Rahman as its head and all the sector commanders as members to run the war effort - Osmani was to be the Defence Minister. Presented by Major Q.N. Zaman^[68] and supported by Maj. Ziaur Rahman during a discussion session of all sector commanders, the officers feared that given the distance between sector headquarters and Kolkata and the poor state of communication, it might be better to have a separate operational wing to run the war effort to lessen the burden on Osmani. The facts were later probably misrepresented to Col. Osmani, who resigned as this proposal was not complementary to his leadership abilities or to his post as CIC.^[67] The following day Osmani resumed his post as CIC after all sector commanders requested him to resume his post. The meeting went on without a glitch and decisions on strategy and organization was taken - all of which were vital for the War. The major decisions were:

Designating the operational area, strength, command structure and role of the Mukti Bahini. General Osmani was to remain C-in-C, with Lt. Col. MA Rab (posted at Agartola with no combat duties) as the Chief of Staff (COS), Group Captain A.K Khandker was made the Deputy Chief of Staff (DCOS). Bangladesh was divided into 11 combat sectors, and individual sector commanders were selected or reconfirmed for each sector. Out of the 11 proposed sectors, 8 became organized and active by July, with sectors no 5 and 11 becoming active in August. Sector no 10 (encompassing all areas east of Teknaf and Khagrachari) was never activated.^[69] and the proposed area of operation for this sector was incorporated in sector no 1. Later the naval commando unit activities were designated as 'Sector 10' and commanded by Osmani himself. Indian Army posted Brig. Ujjal Gupta with a small staff to assist Bangladesh Forces HQ.
Mukti Bahini personnel were divided into 2 broad subdivisions: Regular Forces, and Freedom Fighters.

Regular Forces: This contained the defecting Bengali soldiers and retired members of the Pakistan army and EPR troops. Organised into battalions, these later became known as Z Force, K Force and S Force brigades. Lack of trained regular troops meant majority of recruits were either ex EPR servicemen or newly trained recruits. Those trained men from regular army, EPR, police, Ansar/Mujahids not included in the regular formations were formed into sector troops - which were more lightly armed but operated as conventional force units. Army officers were in command of these detachments. Sector troops were not armed like the regular battalions, but received monthly salaries like their comrades.^[70] The regular force personnel initially operated in the border areas.
Freedom Fighters: Also known as Gonobahini, the newly trained guerrillas were part of this organization. They were lightly armed, received no monthly pay and were deployed mostly inside Bangladesh upon completion of training.

Political and civil organization for each sector as well as war objectives were also discussed and decided upon. Use of Guerrillas to hit the Pakistani armed forces, their collaborators, economic and logistical infrastructure was given priority.

Strategy for the Campaign

General Osmani decided on the strategy for Bangladesh forces to follow and liased with the Indian brass to keep them appraised of such decisions during July - December 1971, but he was not destined to organize an operation like the Tet Offensive or lead in a battle similar to Dien Bien Phu during his sting as C-in-C of Bangladesh forces. His leadership and strategy was a product of his professional career and the demands of the situation on the ground, which also influenced his leadership style to a large extent. He relied on his background of active participation in the South-East Asian sector during the Second World War. From May 15 the Indian army began to help build the liberation force. Major-General Sarker of the Indian Army was appointed as the Liaison Officer between Bangladesh Government-in-exile and the Indian Army. In the meantime Major Safiullah, Major Khaled Musharraf and Colonel Osmani met at Teliapara, a place in Sylhet district and prepared a basic paper on the strategy of the liberation war.^[71] His differences with the Indian brass was to start with the selection of his initial battle strategy. Bangladesh government had hoped to raise a regular force of 30,000 soldiers and 100,000 guerrillas during 1971 − something which the Indians thought unrealistic.^[72] There were also issues concerning the training, deployment and objectives of these forces where opinions between Bangladeshi and Indian leadership differed.

The initial Strategy (July - September 1971)

General Osmani was a conventional soldier with orthodox views and his initial strategy reflects his background. The uncertainty over the timing, scope and scale of direct Indian military intervention was another factor that influenced his decision. Osmani decided to raise a conventional force of regular battalions and use them to free an area around Sylhet, while organizing countrywide guerrilla activity as the secondary effort.^[72]^[73] Bangladesh government in exile requested Osmani to make use of the one resource available in abundance: manpower, and he did not object to the plan of sending thousands of guerrillas into Bangladesh with minimal training. It was hoped that some of the guerrillas would attain the level of expertise needed through experience.^[74]

Two ways to skin a cat

The Indian planners were concerned with the quality and effectiveness of a force raised in haste. They were concerned that such a force would lack the trained junior leaders needed to run an effective campaign.^[75] They had envisioned a force of perhaps 8,000 personnel with at least 3/4 months training (leaders receiving longer training), led by the surviving officer/men of the EBR/EPR^[76] to commence operations in small cells inside Bangladesh by August 1971.^[77] The raising of additional battalions only drained away potential leadership candidates away from the guerrilla forces -undesirable for the Indian outlook.
General Osmani was stubbornly insistent, and his stubbornness did not sit well with the Indians - who thought deputy chief of staff A.K Khandkar was easier to work with.^[78] However, Indians provided support in raising 3 additional battalions and 3 artillery batteries, but also insisted that the raising guerrillas be given due attention, to which Osmani raised no objection. Indians and Osmani differed on the location of the Free area - Indians suggested Mymensingh, but Osmani opted for Sylhet. General Osmani got his way again. Thus while the EBR battalions made ready, Mukti Bahini began sending 2,000 - 5,000 guerrillas inside Bangladesh each month from July onwards. Mukti Bahini commanders had agreed to the following objectives for the guerrillas during the sector commanders meeting:^[79]

Increase Pakistani casualties through raids and ambushed by sending the maximum possible number of guerrillas in the minimum possible time inside Bangladesh.
Cripple economic activity by destroying power stations, railway lines, storage depots and communication systems.
Destroy Pakistani force mobility by blowing up bridges/culverts, fuel depots, trains and river crafts.
The objective is to make the Pakistanis to spread their forces inside the province, so attacks can be made on isolated Pakistani detachments.

General Osmani, however, supported the Indian initiative for training Naval commandos, who were an elite unit trained as per the Indian doctrine, and achieved spectacular results during 1971, demonstrating that he was pragmatic enough to accept Indian suggestions. He took exception to the creation of Bangladesh Liberation Force, a stance supported by sector commanders and the Bangladesh government in exile.

Action and Reaction: June - September 1971

Military map of East Pakistan in May 1971

Pakistani deployment in May 1971, after reorganization of Eastern Command forces following Operation Searchlight (generic representation—some unit locations not shown).

Pakistan army, after expelling the Mukti Bahini from Bangladesh by May 1971, enjoyed a relatively peaceful time between June and July 1971. Mukti Bahini activities had slacked off during the months of preparation, and although the Indian army had begun shelling border outposts (about 50% of the existing 370 were destroyed by the end of July)^[80] to ensure easier infiltration into occupied territories. Bengali regular forces were not ready for operation until mid July. With the conflict largely polarized around the India-East Pakistan border region, Pakistan Eastern command began reorganizing their forces to consolidate their control of the province. The following strategic and tactical steps were taken:^[81]

Pakistan Army deployed the 9th Division (CO Maj. Gen. Shaukat Riza, HQ Jessore, containing the 57th and 107th brigades, which were part of the 14th division prior to March 25) to operate in the area south of the Padma and West of the Meghna Rivers. The 16th Division (CO Maj. Gen. Nazar Hussain Shah, containing the 23rd (formally of the 14th division), 34th and 205th brigades) was responsible for the area north of the Padma and west the Jamuna rivers. The 14th Division (CO: Maj. Gen. Rahim. Khan, HQ: Dacca, containing the 27th, 303rd and 117th brigades, formally of the 9th division, and the 53rd brigade) looked after the rest of the province.
The E.P.C.A.F (East Pakistan Civil Armed Force – 23,000 troops^[82] with 17 operational wings^[83]) was raised from West Pakistani and Bihari volunteers. Razakars (50,000), Al-Badr and Al Shams (5,000 members from each unit)^[84] were organized from collaborating Bengali people. Many of the imprisoned EPR and Army troops were screened and absorbed into the Razakar organization.
Shanti Committees were formed rally public support and provide leadership to Bengalis collaborating with the Pakistani authorities. The police force was reorganized, 5000 police was flown in from West Pakistan^[85] and several civilian bureaucrats were posted to run the civil administration.

This vast organization was employed to control the province with an iron fist. Pakistani authorities decided to continue the terror campaign,^[86] and rejected all call for political compromise and general amnesty, and did nothing to assuage the feeling of the Bengali population suffering under the army occupation.^[85] Strategically, the army deployed in all the sensitive towns, while the other para military units were deployed around the country. The EPCAF took over the duties of the defunct EPR – border and internal security. Pakistani forces occupied 90 Border Out Posts (BOPs) that were deemed crucial, out of 390, half of which had been destroyed by Indian shellfire by July end.^[80] Often ad hoc units were created by mixing EPCAF and Razakars around a skeliton army formation for deployment in forward areas.^[87] Pakistan army probably enjoyed their most peaceful period during the occupation of Bangladesh in 1971 between Late May and mid July, when Mukti Bahini was reorganizing and the Indian army was implementing Operation Jackpot in their support. From their bases the army conducted sweep and clearing operations in the neighboring areas to root out insurgents and their supporters. In absence of a fully fledged logistical system, the troops were ordered to live off the land – abuse of which led to widespread looting and arson. With the insurgency in its infancy – Pakistani army was most active during April - June 1971.

The Monsoon Offensive

Mukti Bahini commanders had agreed to the following objectives during the sector commanders meeting :^[88]

Increase Pakistani casualties through raids and ambushed by sending the maximum possible number of guerrillas in the minimum possible time inside Bangladesh.
Cripple economic activity by hitting power stations, railway lines, storage depots and communication systems.
Destroy Pakistani mobility by blowing up bridges/culverts, fuel depots, trains and river crafts.
The objective is to make the Pakistanis to spread their forces inside the province, so attacks can be made on isolated Pakistani detachments.

As Bengali guerrillas began to increase their numbers and activities inside Bangladesh from June onwards, sending 2000 – 5000 guerrillas across the border and began to become more active in the border areas, Pakistani army also began to adapt to the situation. Razakars and EPCAF were employed to deal with the internal security matters. Pakistan forces, unable to match the Indians shell for shell, declined to take up the challenge, relying on sudden barrages at selected areas. Choosing not to defend all the border outposts, Pakistani forces occupied and fortified 90 strategically located BOPs, while over half of 390 BOPs were eventually destroyed by Indian shellfire by July end to make Mukti Bahini infiltration easier. Pakistanis also build up an intelligence networks to collect information on Mukti Bahini activity and sent informers across the border to give early warning of Mukti Bahini activity.^[89]^[90] Denied permission to launch cross border preemptive strikes, ambushes were laid for Mukti Bahini infiltrators and artillery was used to interdict movement whenever possible. Time consuming efforts were made to defuse mines, a favorite Mukti Bahini weapon. The Mukti Bahini activity was viewed as timid and the main achievements were blowing up of culverts, minimg abandoned railway tracks, and harassment of Pakistani collaborators.^[65] Bengali regular forces had attacked BOPs in Mymensingh Comilla and Sylhet, but the results were mixed. Pakistani authorities concluded that they had successfully contained the Monsoon Offensive, and they were not far from the truth.^[91]^[92]

Silver Linings among dark clouds

The sector commanders reviewed the results of the Mukti Bahini activities during June – August 1971, and General Osmani also conducted an overall assessment in September 1971. The findings were not encouraging; Mukti Bahini had failed to meet the expectations. The reasons for this were numerous and had to be properly handled to get the war effort on course. The main reasons identified were:

The guerrilla network was being built and had not taken firm root in Bangladesh. Guerrillas, with only 3/4 weeks of training, lacked the experience and numbers to compensate their lack of skills. In many cases, they drifted back towards the border after a few days of operations or when under pressure from Pakistani forces.^[93]
Razakar and Shanti Committees were effective in countering the Mukti Bahini activity. About 22,000 better armed Razakars had become such a threat that in some areas Mukti Bahini ceased operating, and in other areas they were forced to operate against the Razakars, which suited the Pakistanis as it kept their forces from harm.
Uncertainty over re-supply and maintenance had caused many of the Guerrillas cautious, they were unwilling to use up their scanty ammunition, which also hampered operations.^[94]
Until the ‘’Crack Platoon’’ members hit targets in Dhaka and the naval commandos simultaneously mined ships in Chittagong, Chandpur, Narayanganj and Mongla on August 15, the slow pace of operations inside Bangladesh was demoralizing for all involved – the Bangladesh issue was losing ground in the international arena^[95]
Bengali regular troops had attacked the BoPs with spirit, but more training, better communication and coordination with Indian army support elements were needed for launching a successful conventional campaign. The attack on Kamalpur by 1st EBR was a bloody repulse, 3rd EBR attack on Bahadurabad was a success. Likewise, attacks by 2nd, 11th and 4th EBR yielded mixed results that only confirmed the conclusion.^[96]
Coordination between Indian forces and Bangladesh forces were poor, there were several incident of misunderstanding and the supply situation needed major improvement. In some areas relationship between Bengali and Indian commanders had degraded to the point of finger pointing^[97] and in many cases conflicting messages had come to Indian and Bengali formations regarding the same operation.^[98] These issues had further eroded the combat capacity of the Bengali forces on the ground during June - August 1971.

The one two punch

Partial representation of Pakistani forces and Mukti Bahini operational setup in November 1971. Some of the location are indicative because of lack of primary data.

The failure of the so called monsoon offensive caused Bangladesh forces high command to rethink their strategy. Since the Bengali brigades (Z,K and S forces) were not ready to liberate and hold a ‘’lodgement area’’ on their own, and there were several issues to with the ongoing guerrilla campaign. It was clear a long struggle awaited the Bangladeshi resistance, which could be cut short with a direct Indian military intervention – which was still uncertain. Several factors changed prior to Bangladesh High Command implementing the next strategy.

The uncertainty over Indian involvement changed – after a meeting between Indian and Bangladesh Prime ministers in October it became clear India was likely to intervene sometime between December 1971 and April 1972.
The Indian –Soviet Friendship pack assures India of superpower support – and enhanced Indian capability to supply the Mukti bahini as Russia began to send their WWII vintage surplus weapons to India.
The Indian Army Eastern Command began to improve their logistical network from October 1971, which also enabled getting supplies to the Mukti Bahini easier. Major General B.N. Sarkar began coordinating the war objectives for Mukti Bahini after consulting with Indian and Bengali officers on the ground and Bangladesh Forces HQ, and distribute the same set of objectives monthly to all concerned. This eliminated the misunderstandings and coordination problems between the Mukti Bahini and the Indian army.
At the beginning of the war Indian authorities officially endorsed only Awami League affiliated volunteer training, after the Soviet-Indian friendship pact for security reasons as India had security issues with some of their domestic left parties activities. After the Soviet-Indian pact, Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmed opened up recruitment to all comers.

Initially, General Osmani thought about dismantling the regular battalions operating under Z, K and S forces and sending platoons from these forces to aid the guerrillas. His associates advised against this and he ultimately let them be, but deployed the Z force battalions separately to aid guerrilla actions around Sylhet. It was decided to senr at least 20,000 trained guerrillas into Bangladesh from September onwards. If even 1/3 of the force succeeded in it’ objective, the effect on the Pakistani forces would be devastating.

Effectiveness and Importance

Despite the limitations and challenges rising from the state of the Indian transport system (training camps were located inside India), remoteness of the guerrilla bases, unavailability and inadequacy of proper supplies,^[99] and the decision of Bangladesh High Command to put the maximum number of guerrillas into battle in the minimum time possible (often after 4 to 6 weeks of training, sometimes resulting in only 50% of the personnel receiving firearms initially),^[100] the operation was effective enough to support the 30,000 regular soldiers (8 infantry battalions, and sector troops) and 100,000 guerrillas that Bangladesh eventually fielded in 1971, and help run a Mukti Bahini campaign that destroyed or damaged at least 231 bridges, 122 railway lines and 90 power stations,^[101] while killing 237 officers, 136 JCOs/NCOs and 3,559 soldiers,^[102] of the Pakistan army and an unspecified number of EPCAF and police and an estimated 5,000 Razakar personnel^[103] during the period of April–November 1971. The Mukti Bahini efforts also demoralised the Pakistani Army to the extent that, by November, they left their bases only if the need arose.^[101] The Pakistani high command decided not to yield any territory and deploy their forces along the whole border. The grouping and regrouping of forces to secure the border and deal with the Mukti Bahini inside Bangladesh led to a loss of cohesion among Pakistani units, especially among the infantry, artillery and mortar regiments. The loss of maneuverability exposed them to a one-dimensional battle.^[104] This stretched them thin without any effective reserves, and they became vulnerable to selective Indian and Bengali strikes when the Undeclared War started from mid November. The prolonged exposure and steady casualties also sapped morale and reduced the effeciveness of the troops considerably
Bengali Naval commandos managed to sink or damage 126 ships/coasters/ferries during that time span, while one source confirms at least 65 vessels of various types (15 Pakistani ships, 11 coasters, 7 gunboats, 11 barges, 2 tankers and 19 river craft by November 1971).^[105] had been sunk between August–November 1971. At least 100,000 tons of shipping was sunk or crippled, jetties and wharves were disabled and channels blocked, and the commandos kept East Pakistan in a state of siege without having a single vessel^[106] The operational capability of Pakistan Navy was reduced as a result and the contribution of the Mukti Bahini to the eventual defeat of Pakistan was enormous,^[107] which would not have been as effective without the aid of Operation Jackpot.

Osmani as C-in-C: Leadership style

General Osmani was not a micro-manager who liked to run the day by day operations and delve on details of every plan being hatched by the sector commanders. He delegated much to the sector commanders, which gave them broad freedom of action but also increased their workload - often stretching their shorthanded sector staff beyond their limits.^[67]^[70] On the other hand, given the distance between Kolkata and the sector Hqs and the absence of any direct links (communications had to be channeled through Indian army comm. system), General Osmani had little choice but to delegate. However, the absence of an integrated command structure made it impossible to implement a full-fledged strategy timely -which was a weakness that remain unsolved.^[108]

General Osmani was not a micro manager obsessed with detail and control. He preferred the sector commanders to implement the broadly agreed on strategy as they saw fit. This gave them freedom of action but sometimes the lack of guidance from Bangladesh forces HQ, especially for resolving differences of opinion with the Indian sector officers, created unwanted tensions and delays.^[109]
A thoroughly professional soldier, Osmani lived a Spartan life, wore simple clothes, ate normal food and used camp furniture despite living in Kolkata during the war, setting up an example for his subordinates. A man of refined culinary tastes, he appreciated the meals served by Indian officers during their meetings but ever the gentleman, never insisted on this.^[110] His style of living was exemplary for his subordinates in this regard^[111]
He did insist on maintain proper protocol while dealing with his Indian counterparts. As C-in-C Bangladesh Forces his position was equivalent to that of Sam Manekshaw, and his dealings with Lt. Gen. Jacob and Lt. Gen Aurora was according to this view and combined with his stubborn nature, made him a hard man to work with in Indian eyes.^[112]
Osmani was pragmatic enough to not to allow his insistence on protocol impede the war effort. He did not view Indians working through Group Captain A.K. Khandker, the deputy Chief-of-Staff (whom the Indians viewed as a pragmatic, polished officer with a practical approach^[113] and clear grasp of strategy), as circumventing his authority.
Having a brusque manner and a volatile temper, he was not above dressing down his subordinates in public – something that was resented by his subordinates. He also had a habit of discussing the legal frame of the future Bangladesh army or other issues not related to the war while touring the front – much to the bemusement and irritation of his fellow officers.
He was against politicizing the Bangladesh forces and in this he had the full support of Tajuddin Ahmed, the prime minister.^[114] He appointed officers on merit and not political affiliation. Although for security reasons only Awami league members were recruited initially for the Mukti Bahini, Osmani opened up the recruitment to all willing to fight for Bangladesh in September with the Prime Ministers approval and support. Sector commanders had recruited non Awami league member prior to this, and Osmani had turned a blind eye despite some of the commanders being branded as leftists and insubordinate by some political leaders.^[115]
Osmani was aware of his image and place in the Bangladesh forces and used it to his advantage. His ability and scope to solve the problems was limited by the extent of Indian support and Bangladesh government in exiles agenda. When confronted with a deadlock, he would often threaten to resign, which would almost always result in the others giving in – another reason some of his subordinates took exception to his leadership style. Only once was his bluff called – when he threatened to resign over placing Bangladesh forces under the Joint Command headed by Lt. Gen. J.S. Aurora, Tajuddin Ahmed agreed to accept if a written resignation was submitted. Gen. Osmani dropped the issue.^[116]

Controversial Issues

Bangladesh Government had decided to form a joint command, which gave Indian Army Eastern Command, headed by Lt. General J.. Aurora, operational authority over Mukti Bahini forces, while Osmani was on inspection of the front lines in Kurigram during early November 1971. The decision was first taken by Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmed in October and later ratified by Bangladesh Government Cabinet and formalised with the Indian government to avoid confusion and increase coordination when between Indian and Bangladesh forces when both started operating in Bangladesh.^[117] Gen. Osmani seriously argued that such an action had no justification. He had argued that Indian units could very well serve with and under the leadership of Bangladesh Forces in their struggle. He seriously split with the Bangladesh Government over this issue and threatened to resign. Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmed agreed to accept the resignation if a written resignation was submitted. Gen. Osmani dropped the issue.^[116]

Issues regarding Mujib Bahini

General Osmani was Commander in Chief of all Bangladesh forces, but a number of units were outside the control of Bangladesh forces HQ. Bengali fighters had raised several bands to fight the Pakistani opposition in various areas of Bangladesh (Kaderia Bahini, led by Tiger Siqqiqi of Tangail is the most famous), and these operated independently of Bangladesh HQ. Osmani spared little thought on them, but the so call Mujib Bahini became a major cause of concern for the Bangladesh government in exile establishment. The Leaders of the Mujib Bahini were initially given permission by General Osmani to recruit student and youth volunteers for the war, but in fact had become leaders of a fully organized, well-armed and -trained force, who allegiance was firstly to Sheikh Mujib and then to their own commanders, not to the Bangladesh government in exile.
No one doubted the skill of the Mujib Bahini or commitment of its members to Bangladesh or their patriotism. Trained by General Uban, an insurgency expert, this force operated under the direction of R&AW outside the Bangladesh forces chain of command and the knowledge of Bangladesh government. Mujib Bahini members were better trained^[68] and better armed than their Mukti Bahini counterparts.^[118] Bangladeshi government and military leadership were concerned because:

Most of recruits of Mujib Bahini had been identified as potential future guerrilla leaders of Mukti Bahini, who had suddenly disappeared from the camps - which was first noticed by Mukti Bahini command in June 1971. Their recruitment into a separate force meant the loss of leadership potential for the Mukti Bahini.^[119]^[120]
Operating outside the command structure and knowledge of Bangladesh leadership, their activities, successful or otherwise, often hindered Mukti Bahini operations. They would often strike in areas without Mukti Bahini knowledge, bringing in unexpected Pakistani retaliation and unhinging Mukti Bahini plans for the area.
Some of the activities of Mujib Bahini was creating misunderstanding and distrust in the field. Some of their members had tried to influence Mukti Bahini members to switch their allegiance, in cases had tried to disarm the guerrillas and some clashes had taken place between Mukti Bahini and Mujib Bahini members, and in some areas Mukti Bahini sector commanders arrested known Mujib bahini members. The Indian Army and other organizations involved in supporting the Bengali resistance were also dissatisfied with the activities of this independent organization which was operating outside the existing chain of command.^[121]

Bangladesh Government in exile took various diplomatic initiatives, including approaching RAW director Ramnath Kao^[122] to bring this organization under the control of the government or under General Osmani without success. By August it was clear the independent activities of Mujib Bahini was detrimental for the war effort and Gen Osmani threatened to resign unless they were brought within the command structure of Bangladesh forces.^[123] A meeting with D.P Dhar on August 29 produced an assurance that Mujib Bahini would inform of their activities beforehand to the sector commander prior to commencing their operations. Another meeting with Ramnath Kao on September 18 produced nothing about R&AW relinquishing their control over Mujib Bahini.
On October 21, Bangladesh Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmed met with Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and she ordered D.P Dhar to solve the issue, who in turn informed Lt. Gen. B.N. Sarkar to meet with Mujib Bahini leaders and take necessary steps. Mujib Bahini leaders failed to show up, but sensing which way the wind was blowing, stopped their disruptive activities. Mujib Bahini, along with the Special Frontier Force under the command of Maj. Gen. Uban, went on to liberate Rangamati in December and helped the Indians dismantle the Mizo insurgent network.

Absence in the December 16 Surrender Ceremony

There have been several controversy theories regarding Col. Osmani not being in Dhaka in December 16, 1971. The most verified information remains Osamani's helicopter which was supposed to carry him to Dhaka form Sylhet was damaged in midair by gun fire & it crash landed in an open field despite being cleared of any Pakistani artillery not in existence on the pathway. Controversial absence of Colonel Osmani from the victory ceremony^[124] After the crash, where Col. Osmani & his crew have been wounded, were rescued immediately by an Indian surveillance jeep, but remained out of touch with Indian and Bangladesh HQ and could not reach Dhaka in time. Regardless of such suspicious situation both Bangladesh & Indian Government stayed blind eyed & sought no further inquiry on the incident.Whereabouts of the C-in-C on 16 Dec. 1971 ^[125] Osmani was elevated to the rank of General of the Bangladesh Armed Forces with effect from the date 16 December 1971.

Liberation War Medals

Bangladesh Government decided to issue four types of medal of valor namely Bir Shereshto, Bir Uttam, Bir Bikram and Bir Pratik for freedom fighters. The list of awardees were selected by several sector commanders and General Osmani at the beginning of 1972.^[126] When the list was published, it came under criticism and was initially cancelled before being officially formalized. General Osmani had been criticized for alleged bias for supporting the list.^[126]^[127]^[128]

General of Bangladesh Army

After the Bangladesh Liberation War ended with the surrender of Pakistan Armed Forces to the joint command of India and Bangladesh on December 16, 1971, Col. Osmani arrived in Dhaka on December 22 and set up his HQ probably in the "LOG Area HQ Building" in Dhaka cantonment.^[129] On January 9, 1972, Gen. Osmani ordered the arrangement of the Bangladesh Armed Forces Honor Guard that received Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on his return on January 10, 1972 at Tezgaon Airport.^[130] Bangladesh Government promoted him to Four Star General (the first ever in Bangladesh history) effective from December 16, 1971 on April 7, 1972,^[3] after January 10, 1972 to honor his contribution during the liberation war. General Osmani continued to be the commander in chief of Bangladesh forces, which was equivalent to the post of a civilian cabinet minister.

Sector Commander Conference January 2–11, 1972

Col. Osmani and Senior Sector Commanders of Mukti Bahini held a conference in Dhaka from January 2 to January 11, 1972 to discuss the future of Bangladesh Armed Forces among other issues. Lt. Col. Abu Taher (Commander Sector 11 -wounded) and Major Jalil (Commander Sector 9 - Closed) were not present in the meeting. In line with the Six Point Programme and Bangladesh Government Cabinet decision to form a National Militia, the conference set up a committee to oversee the formation of this organization. This Militia was to be formed with members of Mukti Bahini and the members of the former East Pakistan Rifles. Major A.N.M Nuruzzaman (Commander Sector 3) was selected to command the militia.
Bangladesh Armed Forces were also reorganized, personnel from Army, Navy, Air Force and Police were ordered to join their respective organizations^[131] and Ex- EPR members joined the newly formed National Militia. Regular Bangladesh Army and Mukti Bahini formations initially were positioned at: Mukti Bahini Sector 1 and K Force in Chittagong, Mukti Bahini Sectosr 2 and 3 in Comilla, Z Force, Sectors 4 and 5 in Sylhet, Sector 6 in Dinajpur and Sector 7 in Rangpur, Sector 8 and 9 in Jessore and Sector 11 and S force in Dhaka.^[132]

Disturbance at Pilkhana

On February 16, 1972 tension between Mukti Bahini members and former EPR members who had not been able to join the Liberation War, erupted in a shooting episode at Pilkhana. Gen Osmani was informed of the incident and arrived at Pilkhana, but was unable to enter due to the ongoing shooting. The firing stopped once President Mujibur Rahman arrived on the scene. General Osmani and Bangabandhu then defused the situation. It was decided to keep the EPR intact as Bangladesh Rifles and create another force called Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini with the Mukti Bahini members.^[133] In April 1972 Bangladesh Government decided to abolish the post of Commander in Chief and create the post of Chief of Army Staff, Chief of Air Staff and Chief of Naval Staff to separate the command structure of the three services.^[134]

Bangladesh Army Structure

Bangladesh Army Infantry, Artillery, Signals, Medical and Engineers arms had been formed during the Liberation War. Between January and March the 12th East Bengal Regiment was formed in Jessore, the 13th EBR (from sector 2 and 3 personnel) in Comilla, 14th and 15th EBR (sector 7 personnel) in Rangpur, 16th EBR (Sector 11 personnel) in Joydevpur, 17th EBR in Dinajpur (Sector 6 personnel) 18th EBR in Comilla (Sector 4 and 5 personnel) and 19th EBR (Sector 1 personnel) in Chittagong.^[131] Bangladesh Army next organized 5 infantry brigades, Z force moved from Sylhet to Comilla and became the 44th Brigade, S force in Dhaka was designated the 46th Brigade, K Force moved to Jessore as the 55th Brigade, the 65th Brigade was formed in Chittagong and the 72nd in Rangpur.^[135]

Civilian Cabinet Minister

The newly formed Bangladesh army had shortage of trained personnel. None of the Mukti Bahini Officers had the training or experience of running an army (the Senior most officers had been Majors in 1971 and at most had commanded a battalion). Furthermore, there were 1100 Bengali officers and 23,000 soldiers interned in West Pakistan, awaiting repatriation to Bangladesh. These Officers included Generals and several Brigadiers with the training and experience that would be invaluable for the newly formed Bangladesh forces, who had to be integrated in Bangladesh forces after their return. General Osmani may have harbored hopes of becoming the defense minister,^[136] so he could continue to stay attached to military affairs, but once Bangladesh Government abolished the post of Commander in Chief, he retired from the army on April 7, 1972 and was appointed as Cabinet Minister with the portfolio of Air and Inland Water Transport Authority on April 12, 1972. Gen. Osmani was an elected member of the parliament and Bangladesh Armed Forces personnel are not allowed to hold political office. Bangladesh Forces General Headquarters was abolished, the Army, Navy and Air Force was now headed by separate commanders. Captain Nurul Huq became Chief of Navy Staff while Group Captain A.K Khandker, who was Deputy Chief of Staff of Bangladesh Forces, became Chief of Bangladesh Air Force.

First Army Chief of Staff in Independent Bangladesh

Lt. Col M.A. Rab, the first Chief of Staff of Bangladesh Army (April 12, 1971 - April 7, 1972), was promoted to the rank of Major General and retired on April 7, 1972. It is believed that General Osmani was consulted regarding his successor and he had recommended then) Brigadier. K.M Shafiullah for the post to President Sheikh Mujib.^[137] The 4 serving senior most army officers who had joined Mukti Bahini in March 1971 from Pakistan Army were: Lt. Col. Salahuddin Mohammad Reza, Major C.R. Dutta, Major Ziaur Rahman and Major K.M. Shafiullah.^[138] Lt. Col Reza was retired as a Colonel in 1972 and C.R Dutta, who was on leave prior to retirement in March 1971 was to become director of Bangladesh Rifles.
Ziaur Rahman had joined the Liberation War on March 25, 1971, K.M Shafiullah joined on March 28, 1971.^[138] Furthermore, Zia and Shafiullah were commissioned on the same day in Pakistan Army (12th PMA Long Course, on 18 September 1955), but Zia was senior to Shafiullah in the final rankings.^[137] Osmani did not have cordial relationship with Ziaur Rahman. Osmani had wanted to sack (then) Lt. Col. Zia after the battle of Kamalpur. However, it is possible that Osmani made no recommendation and the appointmenk of Shafiullah, superseding Ziaur Rahman was a political decision.^[3]^[139]

Cadet College Crisis

Bangladesh Government had issued a Presidential Decree in 1972 turning the existing Cadet colleges into government colleges. A delegation of ex cadets visited (then) Brigadier Ziaur Rahman, who helped then get an appointment with Minister Osmani. Osmani obtained a meeting with President Mujibur Rahman, and after a discussion with him the decree was withdrawn.^[140]

Lt. General Wasiuddin

Lt. General Khwaja Wasiuddin was the senior most Bengali serving in Pakistan Army^[141] after the forced retirement of Maj. Gen. Ishfaqul Majid in 1961.^[142] General Wasiuddin had commanded the II Corps of the Pakistan Army in 1971 (then based in Multan) and had planned to defect, but was unable to do so when he was posted in the Army HQ in Rawalpindi as the Master General Ordnance.^[143] After the defeat of Pakistan he opted for Bangladesh and was interned in his home. General Wasiuddin managed to leave for London in October 1972, and then came to Bangladesh. Osmani had served alongside (then) Brigadier Wasiuddin in 1959 at the GHQ in Rawalpindi GHQ, where Wasiuddin was working on the idea of creating Bengal Artillery Regiments and he shared a cordial relationship with Osmani.^[144]
General Osmani had received him at the Airport and introduced him to important Awami League leaders. Lt. general Wasiuddin was 54 years old and his experience would have been invaluable for newly formed Bangladesh Army. Rumors spread that Bangladesh Government had intended to make Wasiuddin the Army Chief of Staff at the recommendation of Osmani, which was later overturned because some of the Freedom Fighters in Bangladesh Army staff threatened to resign. Osmani was supposedly hurt by this turn of events^[145] General Wasiuddin was posted as an Ambassador. However, when (then) Brigadier Shafiullah, who had replaced Major General M.A. Rab as Chief of Staff in April discreetly enquired about the rumors, Shiekh Mujib reportedly commented that only tested patriots would be the Chief of Staff of Bangladesh Army.^[146]

Resignation from Cabinet

He resigned from the cabinet in May 1975 after the introduction of a one-party government system thanks to the fourth amendment to the constitution. Along with Barrister Mainul Hosein, both elected MPs resigned from the Awami League, protesting the total abolition of democracy in Bangladesh by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. M.A.G. Osmani was selected as an Adviser to the President on 29 August 1975. He resigned shortly after the murder of several leaders in the Dhaka Central Jail.

Presidential Defense Adviser

Osmani never supported the assassinations of August 15, 1975 and never tolerated undue criticism of Sheikh Mujib.^[147]^[148] However, he accepted the post of Defense Advisor (Equivalent of a Cabinet Minister) under Khondkar Mushtaq, who took over as President after the August 15 coup with the support of the coup leaders and may have had prior involvement in the events of August 15. Osmani had disregarded advise to refrain from joining the Mushtaq government,^[149] and was appointed to his post after Maj. Gen. Ziaur Rahman was promoted as the Army Chief of Staff on August 24, 1975, and Maj. General Khalilur Rahman was appointed as the Chief of Defense Staff in the Defense Ministry.^[150]^[151] Although The Defense Advisor post was a cabinet post, Osmani did not accept any salary for his services.^[152] Osmani visited several army formations to stress the need to maintain discipline and morale. It is possible that Gen. Osmani hoped to prevent further bloodshed by using his influence among the armed forces.^[153]^[154] As Defense Advisor he did not oppose the promotion of the August 15 Coup Leaders and the reinstatement in the army of those retired army officers^[150] involved in the coup. Instead of joining their respective units, the coup leaders had installed themselves in Bangabhaban, totally disregarding the Army Chain of Command,^[155] and Osmani accepted the situation. He tried to implemented the decision to disband the Jatyo Rakshi Bahini and place the members in the Police and Anser organizations before Gen. Zia managed to get approval to integrate the Rakshi Bahini formations in the army in October 1975. The coup leaders kept control over the 1st Bengal Lancer and 2nd Field Artillery units,^[156]^[157] which were involved on the August 15th incident, deployed as they saw fit outside the chain of command of the Army HQ. The action of the coup leaders showed the weakness of the Army chain of command and created a de facto parallel command structure.^[158]^[159]
When Brig. Khaled Musharraf came to know of the Jail Killings, he and some of his staff went to Bangabhaban to negitiate a peaceful transfer of power. Khandker Mushtaq and Osmani spent the day negotiating. Col Shaffat Jamil came to Bangabhaban to meet Khalad Musharraf. As he and his soldiers entered the meeting room, he heard Khudker Mushtaq brow beating Khaled Musharraf by saying "I have seen many Brigadiers and General of Pakistan Army! Dont try to teach me." This angered Major Iqbal, CO of the 1st Bengal company, and he drew his gon saying "and Now you will see Majors of Bangladesh Army." Mushtaq started rolling on the floor, Osmani stood between Maj. Iqbal and Mustaq and requested Shaffat Jamil to restore the situation, which Col. Jamil did. After Mushtaq resigedn and a new government was formed, Osmani resigned his post and was driven home.^[160]

The Jatiya Janata Party

Bangobir Osmani started a new political party named Jatiya Janata Party in 1976 and he was elected President of the party. He participated in the 1978 presidential elections as a candidate of the Democratic Alliance party. He later participated in the presidential elections in 1981 as a candidate of the Jatiya Nagarik Committee (National Citizens Committee).

Personal life

Osmani lived as a bachelor throughout his life and had no offspring who exist today. His family home is 18 km south from Sylhet City in the village of Dayamir now renamed as Osmaninagar. His home in the Nayarpul locality of the north-eastern city of Sylhet, from where he hails, is currently a museum - Osmany Museum.
Though a bachelor all his life, Osmani was close to his relatives and family throughout his life. Most trips to Sylhet involved making visits to loved ones, and in Dhaka he would regularly welcome nephews and nieces to his residence. Only his Alsatians were generally disliked, and almost universally feared by visiting folk.

Death

Epitaph of M.A.G Osmani at Sylhet Shah Jalal Mazar

In 1983, aged 65, Osmani was diagnosed with cancer at the Combined Military Hospital (CMH) in Dhaka. He was immediately flown to London for treatment, at the Government's expense. He was attended to by specialists at St Bartholomew's Hospital. Most of his time in the UK was spent staying at the family home of his nephew and niece, Mashahid Ali and Sabequa Chowdhury. Both were beloved to him - the late Mashahid (Shahee) had helped Osmani in his later years by funding the establishment of his political party, the Jatiya Janata Party, following Osmani 's exit from the Mujib government. Sabequa spent formative years of her childhood in Osmani 's home in Sylhet, and Osmani gifted his allocated plot in Dhaka to her in the early 1970s. Osmani's days would pass with an almost endless stream of visitors, well wishers and acolytes calling on him to wish him well, to ask his guidance, or just to see him.
Though Osmani was responding favorably to the cancer treatment, in early February he deteriorated unexpectedly. The hospital diagnosed that he had been given the wrong type of blood at the CMH and that this was now infected. His demise followed immediately after, in bed on 16 February 1984 in London, aged 66. Throughout these months of treatment and convalescence, the famous fire in his eyes and the quiver in his bristly moustache stayed with him until the very end.
Following his sudden death, Osmani's body was flown to Bangladesh. The cavalcade of cars to Heathrow was provided with a special police escort which, with full diplomatic protocol, sped the entourage through the streets of London, stopping the traffic along the route. About a days after his death Osmani was buried in Darga, Sylhet with full military honours. His grave lies adjacent to his mother's.

Legacy

The international airport in his hometown Sylhet has been named in his remembrance as Osmani International Airport.

Muhammad Ataul Gani Osmani is regarded in Bangladesh as one of the greatest leaders and heroes of the nation's freedom fighters, and regarded as a brave man (Bonga Bir) never afraid of laying down his life. Under his command, the organisation and conduct of Bangladesh Armed Forces came into being without whom it would have been very difficult. The international airport in his hometown of Sylhet, where he is respected and remembered very much, has been named after him as Osmani International Airport(Osmani Antorjatik Biman Bondor ). Even the state-run hospital in Sylhet is named after him, as Osmani Medical College and Hospital. Every year, Osmani associations gather to hold huge ceremonies and functions, including engaging in televised discussion of General Osmani's contributions. The medical college situated in Sylhet is named after him, M.A.G. Osmani Medical College, Sylhet. In London Borough of Tower Hamlets, a primany school was named as Osmani Primary School.^[161]

Major General Khaled Mosharraf (Bengali: খালেদ মোশাররফ) (November 01, 1937 – November 7, 1975) was a Bangladeshi military officer who was the Sector Commander of Bangladesh Forces Sector 2 and K-Force Brigade Commander during the Bangladesh War of Liberation. He was awarded Bir Uttam for his gallantry actions during the war. Although he suffered a bullet injury to his frontal skeleton, he recovered and remained in command of BDF Sector 2. On November 3, 1975, Khaled Mosharraf led a military coup against the politicians and military officers who had seized power in Bangladesh in 1975, but during the military uprising on November 7, he was himself overthrown and assassinated.

Early life and army career

Khaled Mosharraf was born in the village of Mosharrafganj in Islampur, Jamalpur District of the province of Bengal, British India (now in Bangladesh). He passed the matriculation examination from Cox's Bazar Government High School^[1] in 1953. Graduating from the Dhaka College in 1955, he joined the Pakistan Army and enrolled at the Pakistan Military Academy in Kakul, West Pakistan. He became adjutant of the 4th Bengal regiment during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. He also served as an instructor at the military academy and obtained an advanced degree from the Command and Staff College in Quetta in 1968. In addition he also received training in the United Kingdom and West Germany.

Bangladesh Forces Commander in the Liberation War

Major Khaled Mosharraf was appointed commanding officer of the 4th Bengal regiment in the Comilla Cantonment on 24 March 1971. Mosharraf led this unit in mutiny following the declaration of independence on behalf of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. He merged his unit into a guerrilla force, and later served as one of its leading commanders.
Famous guerrilla fighter Shafi Imam Rumi took training for the war in Melaghar, Agartala under Sector-2, supervised by Khaled Mosharraf and Rashid Haider. After his training he came to Dhaka to join the Crack Platoon, a group that conducted major guerrilla operations against the Pakistan Army. His major target was to bomb the Siddhirganj Power Station.^[2]
At the end of June, 1971, Shahadat Chowdhury and Habibul Alam came to Rumi's father Sharif's house with a letter from Khaled Mosharraf. Mosharraf asked Sharif information about bridges and culverts of Bangladesh in order to hamper Pakistani occupation army's movement. Patriot Sharif used to provide detail information of the exact points where to set explosives so that the bridge will be damaged but also there will be less damage so that it can be repaired easily after the country is liberated.^[3]
After conducting some successful attacks, Mosharraf and his unit were forced to retreat into the Indian state of Tripura. In an encounter with Pakistani forces, he suffered a gunshot wound to his head and soon recovered after treatment. Following the Bangladesh liberation war and the establishment of an independent Bangladesh, Mosharraf was appointed as the Staff Officer to the HQ of the new Bangladesh Army in Dhaka. In 1973 after attaining the rank of Brigadier, he was appointed to the post of Chief of General Staff. He was also awarded with the military honour Bir Uttom by the government for gallantry by the independent government of Bangladesh in 1972.

Coup of 1975

Following the assassination of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the country's president on 15 August 1975, a new government composing of anti-Mujib political elements was formed under the new president Khondaker Mostaq Ahmad. Mostaq Ahmad issued the Indemnity Ordinance, which gave immunity from prosecution to the killers of Mujib. Outraged at Mujib's killing and the protection of his killers, Mosharraf mobilised pro-Mujib army units with Col. Shafaat Jamil of 46 Brigade to overthrow the regime of Khondaker Mostaq Ahmad on November 3. He had Ziaur Rahman and other members of the government arrested and elevated himself to the rank of Major General and to the position of Army Chief. His mother and brother had led a commemorative procession to Mujib's family residence without his knowledge. However, a mutiny on November 7 consisting of left-wing unenlisted personnel in the army, organised and led by the radical left wing JSD leader Abu Taher, resulted in the assassination of Mosharraf. On the same day, a group of army personnel from 2nd Artillery in Dhaka Cantonment rescued Ziaur Rahman, who reorganised and brought down the mutiny and restored order under the previous Mujib declared State of Emergency. Chief Justice and President Abu Sayem restored Major General Ziaur Rahman as Chief of Army Staff and Deputy CMLA.^[4]

Assassination

Main Article: Assassination of Khaled Mosharraf
On 6 November 1975, Major General Mosharraf with two others fellow officers Colonel Najmul Huda and Colonel A.T.M. Haider, went to 10th East Bengal Regiment. Next morning, i.e., on November 7, 1975 at 11 AM, under order of an officer from 2nd Field Regiment Artillery (rumour to be Lieutenant Colonel Mohiuddin Ahmed (executed on 28 January 2010 for killing Sheikh Mujibur Rahman), Captain Asad and Captain Jalil of 10th East Bengal Regiment shot and killed General Khaled Mosharraf with his two fellow officers.^[5]^[6] Ironically, both Captain Asad and Captain Jalil fought in K force under Khaled Mosharraf during Bangladesh Liberation War and once Khaled Mosharraf had saved Captain Asad's life while taking risk on his own life.^[7]

Born: 17 March, 1920, Tungipara Upazila
Assassinated: 15 August, 1975 (aged 55), Dhaka
Political party: Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (1975)
Other political: Awami League (1949–1975) All-India Muslim League (Before 1949)
Religion:Islam
Education:, University of Dhaka, University of Calcutta Maulana Azad College

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was a Bengali nationalist politician and the founding leader of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. He headed the Awami League, served as the first President of Bangladesh and later became its Prime Minister. He is popularly referred to with the honorary title of Bangabandhu. His eldest daughter Sheikh Hasina Wajed is the present head of the Awami League and the current Prime Minister of Bangladesh.
A student political leader, Mujib rose in east Pakistani politics and within the ranks of the Awami League as a charismatic and powerful speaker. An advocate of socialism, Mujib became popular for his leadership against the racial and institutional discrimination of Bengalis. He demanded increased regional autonomy, and became a fierce enemy of the military rule of Ayub Khan.
Sheikh Mujib was born in Tungipara, a village in Gopalganj District,Bangladesh to Sheikh Lutfur Rahman, an officer in charge for record-keeping at the Gopalganj civil court. He was the third child in a family of four daughters and two sons. In 1929, Mujib entered into class three at Gopalganj Public School, and two years later, class four at Madaripur Islamia High School. However, Mujib was withdrawn from school in 1934 to undergo eye surgery, and returned to school only after four years, owing to the severity of the surgery and slow recovery.
Marriage:
In 1938, at the age of eighteen, Mujib married Begum Lutfunnesa. She gave birth to their two daughters—Sheikh Hasina and Sheikh Rehana—and three sons—Sheikh Kamal, Sheikh Jamal and Sheikh Russel.
The Six Point Program:

In 1966, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman declared six point plan at a national conference of opposition political parties at Lahore, which conveyed independent of Bangladesh through 1971 Liberation War.

1. Pakistan would have a federal structure of government based on sense of the Lahore Resolution of 1940, with a parliament elected on the foundation of universal adult franchise;

2. The federal government would have authority only in defence and foreign affairs and all other subjects would be operated by the federating units of the state of Pakistan;

3. There would be two freely exchangeable currencies for the two wings of Pakistan or two separate reserve banks for the two regions of the state;

4. The power of taxation and revenue collection would be vested in the federating units and the federal center will have no such authority. The federation will be entitled to a share in the state taxes to meet its expenses;

5. There would be two separate accounts for overseas exchange reserves for the two wings;

6. East Pakistan would have a separate militia or paramilitary force.

Rahman, (Shahid) Ziaur (1936-1981) President of Bangladesh, Chief of Army Staff, leading freedom fighter, who declared the Independence of Bangladesh. Ziaur Rahman was born on l9 January 1936 at Bagbari in Bogra.

His father Mansur Rahman was a chemist working in a government department in Calcutta. His early childhood was spent partly in the rural area of Bogra and partly in Calcutta. After the partition of India (1947), when his father was transferred to Karachi, Zia had to leave the Hare School in Calcutta and became a student of the Academy School in Karachi. He completed his secondary education from that School in 1952. In 1953, he got himself admitted into the D.J. College in Karachi. In the same year he joined the Pakistan Military Academy at Kakul as an officer cadet.

Ziaur Rahman

Shahid Ziaur Rahman was commissioned in 1955 as a second lieutenant. He served there for two years, and in 1957, he was transferred to East Bengal Regiment. He also worked in the military intelligence department from 1959 to 1964. In the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 he made his mark as a valiant fighter in the Khemkaran sector as the commander of a company, and incidentally, his company was one of those which were offered maximum gallantry awards for heroic performances in the war. He was appointed a professional instructor in the Pakistan Military Academy in 1966. In the same year he was sent to the Staff College in Quetta for attending a command course. In 1969, he joined the Second East Bengal Regiment as its second-in-command at Joydevpur. He was sent to West Germany for higher training. On his return home in 1970 Ziaur Rahman, then a major, was transferred to Eighth East Bengal Regiment at Chittagong as its second in command.

After the military crackdown since the night of 25 March 1971 sheikh mujibur rahman was arrested and the political leaders dispersed. The people were at a loss. At this crucial moment when the political leadership failed to give any direction, the Eighth East Bengal Regiment under the leadership of Major Ziaur Rahman revolted against the Pakistan Army and took up the Bangladesh flag as its mainstay on the night between 26 and 27 March 1971. Then he took up the momentous decision of declaring the Independence of Bangladesh. Ziaur Rahman and his troops were in the forefront of the War of Independence. Major Zia and the armed forces under his command kept the Chittagong and Noakhali areas under control for a few days and went across the border for further preparations.

Ziaur Rahman played a brilliant role in the War of Liberation both at the level of planning and execution. As the commander of Sector I up to June 1971, later on as the head of Z-Force, Ziaur Rahman distinguished himself as a brave warrior and was offered the gallantry award of Bir Uttam.

After the most creditable performances during the nine-month war, he was appointed brigade commander in Comilla. In June 1972, he was made Deputy Chief of Staff of the armed forces of Bangladesh. In the middle of 1973, he became a Brigadier, and a Major General by the end of the year. When Khondakar Moshtaq Ahmad assumed the office of the presidency, Ziaur Rahman became the chief of army staff on 25 August 1975. When Khaled Mosharraf with the support of the Dhaka Brigade under the command of Shafat Jamil staged a coup d'etat on 3 November 1975, Ziaur Rahman was forced to resign his command and was put under house arrest. The Sepoy-Janata Biplob of 7 November, however, took him to the centre of political power. In fact, he had to assume the responsibility of managing the affairs of Bangladesh on the crest of the Sepoy-Janata Biplob.

On 7 November 1975, Ziaur Rahman was proclaimed the Chief Martial Law Administrator. In a meeting at the army headquarters on the same day, a new administrative set-up for the running of an interim government was arranged with Justice Sayem as the Chief Martial Law Administrator and the three service chiefs, Major General Zia, Air Vice Marshal MG Tawab and Rear Admiral MH Khan, as Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrators. Ziaur Rahman became Chief Martial Law Administrator on 19 November 1976, when Justice Sayem relinquished his position and ultimately, the President of Bangladesh on 21 April 1977, when President Sayem resigned.

After assuming office as head of the state Ziaur Rahman issued a proclamation order amending the Constitution to insert Bismiliah-ir-Rahmanir Rahim (In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful) in the Preamble of the Constitution. In Article 8(1) and 8(1A) the principle of 'absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah has been added. In Article 8(1), socialism has been defined as 'economic and social justice'. In Article 25(2) it has also been provided that "the state shall endeavour to consolidate, preserve and strengthen fraternal relations among Muslim countries based on Islamic solidarity."

Ziaur Rahman introduced and popularised the new concept of Bangladeshi nationalism. He believed that in a plural society like Bangladesh where people are of diverse ethnicity and where they profess different faiths, have different cultural traits and various lifestyles, nationalism should better be conceptualised in terms of territory rather than language or culture. This is what he emphasised upon. Bangladeshi nationalism took firm root and shape as a unifying force with its emphasis on national unity and integration of all citizens of Bangladesh irrespective of caste, creed, gender, culture, religion and ethnicity.

Assuming power, Zia immediately moved to restore law and order in the country and for the purpose strengthened the police force, practically doubling its size from 40,000 to 70,000 and arranging for their proper training. He also restored order in the armed forces. For the purpose, he took certain steps for the development of professionalism in them through rigorous training and restoring discipline. He expanded their strength substantially from less than 50,000 in 1974-75 to about 90,000 in 1976-77. Although Zia was successful in restoring discipline within the armed forces, he had to confront a number of mutinies and attempted coups forcing him to adopt certain stern actions against those who had taken part in those uprisings.

A believer in democracy Zia moved as fast as he could to democratise the polity by re-instituting the institution of election either for enabling a political party to assume power or for transferring it to other political party peacefully. As a first step, that is why, he allowed the disbanded political parties to be revived and political activities to be carried on once again. Having that in view, he also disallowed the ban on the newspapers and inaugurated the free flow of news by making the news media free. For the same purpose, he re -instituted the independence of judiciary as the bulwark of rights of the people. The prevailing situation persuaded him to take part in active politics so that he could establish democratic order in the country. In February 1978 he floated Jatiyatabadi Ganatantric Dal with Vice President Justice Abdus Sattar as its head. Zia himself became the nominee of the Nationalist Front consisting of six political parties in the presidential election. He won a comprehensive victory by securing 76.67% of the votes.

On 1 September 1978, a new political party, bangladesh nationalist party (BNP), was launched with Zia as its chairman. The parliamentary elections were held in February 1979 and BNP won 207 seats out of 300. On 1 April 1979, the first session of the jatiya sangsad was convened. On 9 April, martial law was lifted after the enactment of the Fifth Amendment.

President Zia's dynamic economic policy laid emphasis on private sector development. A new development strategy designed to encourage the private entrepreneurs, both local and foreign, and to promote agricultural development through massive subsidies to the farmers was initiated. The process of handing over nationalised industries to their former owners began. Promotion of export of conventional and non-conventional goods became a national priority. Food production reached a new height and Bangladesh began exporting rice.

To bring in dynamism in his action plan Zia put forward a 19-point programme, and that was designed to bring rapid socio-economic transformation in the country. The main thrust of the programme was self-reliance and rural uplift through people's participation. Its primary objectives were accelerated agricultural growth, population control, self-sufficiency in food, decentralisation of administration and greater incentives to the private sector. It was designed to meet the basic needs of the people and special needs of women, youths and workers, and it aimed at establishing a political order based on social justice.

For bringing rapid socio-economic transformation in the country, President Zia transformed the politics of the country into a production-oriented one. He chalked out programmes of action for the purpose, terming these as revolutions and motivated his party men to realise those programmes through their devotion and commitment. The first of those was canal digging, and it was designed to supply adequate water to the farmers, especially during the lean season. The second was to remove illiteracy from the society so that an air of enlightenment might prevail all around using both formal and non-formal techniques all over the country. Moreover,

motivational

programmes were set on for the enhancement of productions both in the field and factories. The initiation of family planning programme, revolutionary as it was, was designed to stabilise population at a level which might be termed as optimum from the economic point of view. The institution of Gram Sarker aimed at enlisting the support of the people for a self-reliant Bangladesh, which president Zia advocated. Zia began executing his programme in right earnest and beneficial results were in sight. The excavation and re-excavation of more than 1,500 canals in a year and a half, record production of food grains in two successive years (1976-77 and 1977-78), an average annual GDP growth of 6.4% during 1975-78, a vigorous mass education campaign, introduction of village government (Gram Sarkar) and Village Defence Party (VDP) made deep impression in the minds of the people.

Having the objectives of establishing good neighbourly relations with India and other South Asian countries on equal footing Zia started bringing in changes first at the internal setting through resurgence of nationalistic aspirations of the people and then by stabilising countervailing forces at the regional and international levels.

The foreign policy goals were thus devised anew, and dynamic international relations were set on with a view to preventing Bangladesh from hurtling down to the abyss of dependence. At the regional level, Bangladesh developed a pattern of mutuality with such states as Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, and Maldives along with India so much so that it ultimately led to the forging of regional co-operation in the region for the first time in its history.

At the international level, Bangladesh, then a lonely sojourner, picked up friends from both the right, centre and left and established a kind of viable comradeship amongst them. Bangladesh was lifted from the dead end of the Indo-Soviet axis and Indian hegemonic circle. Bangladesh came closer to the Muslim world of more than fifty states, which began to take fresh look at Bangladesh and its problems. One of the superpowers of the time became a good friend of Bangladesh, though its role was not people-friendly during the Liberation War. Bangladesh developed a good working relation with China. South East Asian countries were drawn closer. The distant Europe remained no longer disinterested in the affairs of Bangladesh.

Through certain creative moves, he drew Bangladesh into the world of the liberal west, the fraternal middle East and West Asia, and the rising South East Asia. He attended many international conferences and visited dozens of countries to promote the cause of the nation's multilateral and bilateral relations. The dividend was rich. Bangladesh was elected to the Security Council in one of its non-permanent seats in 1978, and became actively involved in the activities of the UN members. In the middle East and West Asia Bangladesh emerged as a forceful actor. It was President Zia who conceived of the idea of, and initiated actions for, regional co-operation is South Asia. For the purpose, he visited these countries during 1979-80 to speak of the need to develop a framework for mutual co-operation. south asian association for regional cooperation (SAARC) was the outcome of his efforts, which was formally launched in Dhaka in 1985. Zia did not survive to see his dream come true. He was assassinated in Chittagong on 30 May 1981 in an abortive army coup. He lies buried at Sher-e-Banglanagar, Dhaka.

Wing Commander M. Hamidullah Khan (BAF-Retd.) (Bengali: এম হামিদুল্লাহ খান) (11 September 1938 – 30 December 2011) was the Sector Commander of BDF Sector 11 Bangladesh Forces during the Bangladesh Independence War against Pakistan in 1971. M. Hamidullah Khan represented Bangladesh during the 36th Session of the United Nations General Assembly as Special Envoy in granting recognition to the State of Palestine and the plenary session on UN Resolutions 242 and 439 on the question of Palestine and Namibia respectively.^[1]

Family, early life and education

M. Hamidullah Khan was born to a political family in Medini Mondal village, Louhajong Ward, in the rural town of Bikrampur, of southern Dhaka, in then Bengal Province of the colonial British Empire. He is the second of the nine children (one deceased in infancy) born to Muhammad Dabiruddin Khan and Jasimunnesa Khan. His father was a Forest Ranger in the British Imperial Forest Service under the Bengal and Assam Forest Department. Flight Lieutenant Hamidullah married Rabeya Sultana Khan on 1 August 1965, at Dhaka, the third daughter of Mokbul Hossain Siddiqi, then Commissioner (East Pakistan) of Taxes and Excise.
Hamidullah Khan's childhood was divided between living in Bikrampur and Dhaka city proper. He moved, with his parents, in 1954 to Mughaltully Ward of Dhaka. Hamidullah spent his adolescence in Dhaka. With the departure of the British and official creation of Pakistan and India in 1947, Hamidullah Khan's father opted for service with the government of India rather than Pakistan, though the family remained in Dhaka (East Pakistan). Dabiruddin Khan later joined them after retirement in 1957.
After primary school at Silver Jubilee Anglo-Bangla Government English School, Guwahati, Assam, and secondary school for a year at Rangamati Missionary School at Chittagong Hill Tracts, he matriculated from Louhajong A.T Institute in Dhaka Bikrampur. He then enrolled in Jagannath University in 1954. After completion of senior secondary school in 1956, he studied at the same college for the Bachelor of Arts in Commerce (General). Hamidullah also had enrolled into the four years Honours program at Dhaka Textile College at Tejgaon and continued simultaneously. In the year 1959, while preparations were finalised to study law after BA finals he accepted an appointment instead as a candidate in the Pakistan Air Force Academy, and reported to Risalpur in the 34th GD(P)as a flight cadet. He graduated in the GD (Admin) branch, later structured and organised as A&SD Branch in the BAF and subsequently attached in the specialisation of security and intelligence under the Provost Marshall's office.^[2]

Air Force Career

M. Hamidullah Khan joined the Pakistan Air Force in June 1962 . He was commissioned a Pilot Officer. He served in the Pakistan Air Force at bases in Lahore, Chaklala, Sargodha, Karachi, Peshawar, and finally Dhaka. In 1970, Flight Lieutenant Hamidullah was transferred to Pakistan Eastern Zone as Assistant Provost Marshal with additional responsibility as Director of Security, Tejgaon International Airport, Dhaka. He was selected for examination and board for promotion to Squadron Leader in July 1970.

Bangladesh War of Independence

Hamidullah was assigned as the Asst. Provost Marshall in the Eastern Zone of Pakistan Air Force Provost Marshal P ans S Unit 5, Dhaka. On 30 March Flt. Lt. Hamidullah defected the PAF and reported to the Bangladesh Provincial government at 8 Theatre Road, Calcutta, on April 14 through Agartala. Initially he was posted as Bangladesh Representative at Chakulia Guerilla Training Camp, Bihar. In July 11~17th, he attended the Bangladesh Sector Commanders Conference of 1971. He was subsequently posted at Teldhala, BDF Sector 11 HQ. Major Ziaur Rahman, then in command of the entire war effort in that Sector(Central Sector) appointed Hamidullah the sub-sector commander of sub-sector 1 at Mankachar (July~Nov 2nd 1971) with additional responsibility of as administrator of the Roumari area. As sub-sector commander, he commanded over 800 troops, and fought 22 major ambushes, raids, demolitions and counterattacks. In recognition Flight Lieutenant Hamidullah received a Battlefield Promotion to Squadron Leader under direct orders from BDF C-in-C Colonel M.A.G Osmani. The most significant and largest guierilla operation among the operations he planned and led was the Chilmari Operation. Squadron Leader M. Hamidullah Khan organised, planned and led the Chilmari expedition Oct 16th~17th, crossing the Ganges river by Kurigram.

Post Independence

After independence, Hamidullah was inducted as per governmt D/O of April 7, to serve Bangladesh Air Force BAF. In April 1972, he was appointed the first Provost Marshal of Bangladesh Air Force. In 1973 Squadron Leader M. Hamidullah khan received his final promotion to Wing Commander. While in BAF, he served BAF headquarters, Intelligence and Security, and Air Education and Training. He also held the position of Chief of Air Force Security(Provost Marshall), Director Air Intelligence and Director Recruiting. He was Officer Commanding Administration Branch at BAF Base Bashar.^{[citation needed]} Hamidullah officially retired from Bangladesh Air Force on 10 January 1979.
Hamidullah received a service award for gallantry. M. Hamidullah Khan wrote a three volume book "71' Northern Front" (in Bangla: Ekature Uttor Ronangon) of his and the guerrilla fighters accounts of the War of Independence, squarely concentrating on the Central Sector BDF Sector 11. He also authored 4 more books on the events related to the war and post independence. The Bangladesh Government named Road 23 in the town of Banani in Dhaka after him.^[3] Along with 55 other fighters, his biography was included in a CD released by the Bangladesh government.^[4]

Political career

In September 1978, M Hamidullah Khan joined the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) by the calling of war colleague Ziaur Rahman, founder of the party. In the BNP's first council held in 1978, Hamidullah Khan was appointed as the party's first Executive Secretary of the Central Executive Committee, later redesignated as Office Secretary. He remained in that post until 1989. In the party's second national council he was made the Secretary of the BNP International Affairs Committee. In the 5th National Council of BNP Hamidullah was appointed the Secretary of the Central Committee of the BNP National Executive Committee on Independence War and Veterans Affairs, which he held until his passing. He was nominated four times and elected thrice in Jatiyo Sangshad elections. He was elected in

Bangladesh General Election, 1979: Constituency Dhaka-5 ( Louhajong and Sreenagar Sub-Districts); service duration 2 years 11 months (2 February 1979 – 24 March 1982)
Bangladesh General Election, 1991: Constituency Munshigonj-2 ( Louhajong and Sirajdikhan Sub-Districts); service duration 4 years 9 months (27 February 1991 – 24 December 1995)
Bangladesh General Election, 1996 (February) Constituency Munshigonj-2 ( Louhajong and Sirajdikhan Sub-Districts); service duration 18 days (12 March 1996 – 30 March 1996)
Bangladesh General Election 2008: Constituency Dhaka-15 ( Mirpur Model Town^{[disambiguation needed]} and Kafrul Town) – Nominated

He re-emerged from an absence to re-enter public life and began publicly speaking on social, political and economic matters in the country. During the caretaker government administration he spoke eloquently shedding light on the history of Bagladesh independence war and relating issues. BNP party chief former prime minister Begum Khaleda Zia recalled him to active politics and nominated him for the electoral seat of Dhaka-15 (Mirpur and Kafrul) for the 9th Parliamentary General Elections held on 29 December 2008. Allegations of massive vote rigging by his Awami League opponent was reported^[5]
He served in different positions in Bangladesh government throughout his active life. Hamidullah served as chairman of Bangladesh Post Graduate Medical Research Centre (1979–1982), Bangladesh Freedom Fighters Welfare Trust (1993–1996), Janata Bank (1995–1996).
He wrote books on his accounts of the creation of the Bangladesh Forces and the events leading to it, BDF Sector 11, its war operations including surrounding complexities, related events and consequences of the Indian occupation. Hamidullah also wrote about events and aftermath of the November 1975 and 1977 BAF uprisings. His second book is a two-volume set about the Bangladesh Independence War along with two documentaries. Many of his interviews and articles appeared in the national dailies and magazines.

Death

Upon his death, Muhammad Hamidullah Khan was given a state funeral^[6] with a military guard of honour.^[7] Hamidullah Khan is survived by his spouse Rabeya Sulatna Khan and two sons, Murad Hamid Khan (Sonny) and Tariq Hamid Khan (Konny).[2]

Major General Muhammad Abul Manzoor (1940–1981) was a Bangladesh army general who was a war hero as a freedom fighter and Sector Commander of BDF Sector 8 during the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971. He launched a coup d'etat and assassination of President Ziaur Rahman on 30 May 1981 at Chittagong. He was killed shortly after while being captured. About a year later, the military took over the government in a bloodless coup, holding power until 1990.

Manzoor had been awarded valor under fire Bir Uttam by the Bangladeshi Government for his bravery in the liberation war. Manzoor was appointed as the youngest divisional commander of Bangladesh Army, GOC (General Officer Commanding) of 24th Infantry Division headquartered at Chittagong. His surviving wife and four children were given political asylum in the United States.

Early life

MA Manzoor was born at village Gopinathpur under Kasba thana of Comilla district in 1940. His paternal home is at village Kamalpur in Chatkhil thana of Noakhali district. His family moved to East Pakistan after Partition. He passed senior Cambridge in 1955 and ISC examination in 1956 from the Sargoda Public School in Punjab.
He joined the East Bengal Regiment as a commissioned officer of then East Pakistan. In 1958, he attended Staff College in Canada, where he obtained his PSC. After the Liberation War started, Major Manzoor was a Brigade Major of a Para Commando Brigade close to the Indian border.
He fled Pakistan on a daring escape with his family and a few fellow officers across the border to India. From there, they made their way to Bangladesh, and Manzoor joined up with fellow officers from East Bengal. He quickly became a prominent officer within the ranks and won many battles in his sector. He commanded Sector – VIII during the Liberation War from September 1971 to victory on December 1971.
In 1974-76, he was posted in New Delhi as Military Attache in the Bangladesh Embassy to India. Known for his tenacity, keen eye for strategy, and formation of loyalty from colleagues, in 1975 he was promoted to Colonel.
Upon his return to Dhaka in 1977, he was promoted to Brigadier. In 1980, he was promoted to Major General at the age of 41. He was one of the youngest generals of a front-line force in south-east Asia's history.

Role in assassination of Ziaur Rahman

Main article: Assassination of Ziaur Rahman

General Hussain Muhammad Ershad, Chief of Army Staff, transferred General Manzoor to a non-combatant post in Dhaka as Commandant of the Defenece Services Command and Staff College.^[1] Manzoor was the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of Chittagong, and freedom fighters placed under his command were given the highest posts.^[2] Once the transfer order was sent to Manzoor, he launched a coup on the morning of 30 May, and ordered the killing of President Ziaur Rahman at Chittagong Circuit House.^[2] That Sunday, 30 May, Manjoor broadcast on Bangladesh Radio from Chittagong station, saying, "Let us have a united stand to run the country and make it a real nation of the people."^{[citation needed]}
NOTICE! See http://www.thedailystar.net/newsarchive/rashomon-and-the-murder-of-major-general-abul-manzur-bir-uttam-20595 for recent evidence that General Abdul Manzur did not murder Ziaur Rahman but was in fact murdered lest he expose the true facts. http://www.thedailystar.net/the-nation-fed-cooked-up-story-21774
http://www.thedailystar.net/drama-over-enquiry-21931

In the face of an ultimatum for surrender by the government, most of Manzoor's troops had abandoned their posts or had joined the government, which ended the rebellion. Later, government soldiers retook the radio station, and Bangladesh Radio announced a US$30,000 reward for capture -dead or alive- of Manzoor.

Capture and death

Although the assassination of President Ziaur Rahman was carried out in Chittagong on 30 May 1981, the military coup d'état failed. General Manzoor went on radio to speak to the nation. According to the historian Anthony Mascarenhas in his Bangladesh: A Legacy of Blood, Manzoor effectively isolated Chittagong from the rest of the country. Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant General Hussain Muhammad Ershad, quickly ordered to suppress any such action and issued orders to kill or capture Manzoor.^[1] Manzoor, with some of his supporters, were captured by the Army about 40 miles southeast of Chittagong while they were driving towards Indian border. Manzoor was reported to have been killed on spot by angry soldiers on 2 June 1981.^[3]
In less than a year, General Hussain Muhammad Ershad took over the country in a bloodless coup.

Trial

No trial took place for Manzoor's assassination.

Family and legacy

He left behind his wife and four children.^[4]^[5] They received political asylum in the U.S.
He was considered a war hero as Sector 8 Commander in the Liberation War.^[6]

Major General Kazi Mohammad Shafiullah (Bir Uttam) was the 1st Chief of Army Staff of the Bangladesh Army. During the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971, he was the Second in Command of Second East Bengal Regiment that revolted with six officers on the night of March 25, 1971. He became one of three brigade commanders, leading what was called the "S-force" (after his surname) during the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971.

He served as Chief of Army Staff from 5 April 1972 to August 25 1975. Prior to 5 April there was no appointment of Army Chief, thus Shafiullah is the first chief.

Bangladesh forces

Shafiullah was the Sector Commander of Bangladesh Forces Sector 3. His sector was mainly the opposite of Sylhet. The sector's areas were Dhaka, Mymensingh, Sylhet and parts of Comilla (present Brahmanbaria district).
Later three brigades were formed, each identified by the initial of the commander's surname. His formation was fully structured and formalised by the end of September. As of September ’71, Commander of Sector 3 was assigned to Major A.N.M Nuruzzaman. Major Shafiullah was among those attending the Pakistan surrender on 16 December 1971 at Race Course in Dhaka.

Chief of Army Staff

After the end of the war in December 1971, the Bangladesh government awarded him the Bir Uttam for his bravery and dedication, the second-highest military award in the country. He was appointed as the Chief of Army Staff of Bangladesh Army in 5 April '72 by the Awami League government under Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.^[1]
Before 5 April '72 Colonel Osmani was the tri services commander, it is the 5th April when army chief appointment was made. Army command was given to Shafiullah, in 7 April air force to A K Khandker and navy to Nurul Haq.
Dismissed from the position in Aug 25, '75 by the following Mushtaq government, he retired from army. General Shafiullah quickly accepted an ambassadorial post overseas, along with fellow Bangladesh Air Force Chief of Air Staff Air Vice Marshal A.K. Khandker

Colonel Shafaat Jamil (Bengali: শাফায়াত জামিল), Bir Bikram (March 1,1940 - August 11,2012) a career Bangladesh Army officer, was Commanding Officer of the 3rd East Bengal Regiment of Z Force Brigade in Sector 11 of Bangladesh Forces during the War of Bangladesh Independence in 1971. He was among the first Bengali officers who rebelled against the Pakistani Army in the 1971 Liberation War of Bangladesh and later fought in 11 sector and in Sylhet sector.^[1]

Early life

He was born on March 1, 1940 in the in Kishoreganj District. His father A.H. M. Karimullah was a Judicial Officer of East Pakistan Civil Service. Jamil was educated at Dhaka College, University of Dhaka and Pakistan Military Academy, Kakul. He joined the Pakistan Military Academy in 1962.
In 1964, he was commissioned as a Second Lieutenent in the Pakistani Army's East Bengal Regiment. He was a coursemate of General Pervez Musharraf, the former President of Pakistan.

Role in Bangladesh Liberation War

In March, 1971 Jamil was promoted to the rank of Major in the Pakistani Army. On 27 March, 1971 he mutinied against the Pakistani Army with Bengali officers and soldiers of 4th East Bengal Regiment (nicknamed Baby Tigers) after hearing the news of the genocide carried out by the Pakistani Army in East Pakistan/Bangladesh. As a Bangladesh Force (BDF) officer he fought against the Pakistani Forces in Sector-11 until October 10, when he was ordered to fight in the Sylhet sector in Bangladesh.
In June 1971 he was appointed Commanding Officer of the 3rd East Bengal Regiment in Sector 11 under Sector Commander Major Ziaur Rahman, later Commander of Z Force Brigade. The 3rd East Bengal Regiment participated in numerous operations of varying scale. Zia also entrusted Jamil the defence of the Teldhala area . Under Zia's directive Major Jamil, assisted by Lieutenant Nurun Nabi and Captain Anwar, set up the first functioning Administrative Area there, which included a police station (The Roumari Police Station), a magistrate court, Customs and Excise hall, a public school, a jail house and a 10 bed hospital. On August 27 he was present with Zia at the opening of the first post office and two sub-post offices in the vicinity. On 11 October 1971 Major Shafaat Jamil's 3rd East Bengal Regiment participated in the battles of Chattak, Sylhet, Bangladesh. Although the Chattak Operation failed, under Jamil's leadership the 3rd East Bengal Regiment killed 364 Pakistani soldiers. Major Shafaat Jamil led his battalion in the Radhanagar Operation and he was injured in this battle. Jamil's battalion captured the Pakistani position where the Indian Army's Gurkha Regiment had previously failed. Later Jamil received medical treatmtent for battle injuries at Shilong Military Hospital, Shilong, India.

Bangladesh Army

After the Independence War of Bangladesh, Jamil was promoted to Lt. Col. and was awarded Bir Bikram (the third highest gallantry award of Bangladesh). In 1974 he was promoted to Colonel and appointed Brigade Commander of 46 Infantry Brigade of Bangladesh Army at Dhaka cantonment. He helped Brigadier Khaled Mosharraf to initiate an armed uprising on November 3, 1975 and proceeded towards Banga Bhaban against the regime of Khondaker Mostaq Ahmad. Change came on 6 November with the exit of Moshtaque from the presidency and his replacement by Justice Abu Sadat Mohammad Sayem.^[2] On 7 November, a mutiny incited by Abu Taher resulted in the collapse of the coup; Khaled Mosharraf was assassinated while Colonel Jamil was arrested. He was retired from the Bangladesh Army on Mar 26, 1980.^[3]

Death

Jamil lived a quiet life after his retirement, and generally stayed far away from the media. In the early hours of 11th August, 2012 he was taken to the Combined Military Hospital (CMH), Dhaka after complaining of chest pains, however as his health deteriorated on the way, he was taken to Apollo hospital, Dhaka instead. He was declared dead by doctors at Apollo hospital at 2:10 AM.^[1]
Shafat Jamil's namaz-e-janaza (funeral prayer) was held at the Central Mosque of Dhaka Cantonment after Duhr prayers on 11th August. State minister for liberation war affairs ministry Captain Tajul Islam (Retired) and several military officers took part in the final prayer. He was buried at Banani's Army graveyard with traditional military honour and state honour.
Chief of the Army Staff General Iqbal Karim Bhuiyan paid his respects to the deceased at Banani's Military graveyard.^[4]

Family

He left behind his wife, three sons and four grandchildren. His two eldest sons live in the USA while his youngest son is serving in the Bangladesh Army .^[1]

Lieutenant Colonel Abu Taher (retired – BD Army) (Bengali: আবু তাহের) (1938–1976) was a communist and a left-leaning radical activist of the Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal, responsible for the Soldiers Mutiny and Uprising and the radical break-out that occurred in Dhaka, which killed countless officers and men, along with their spouses on 7 November 1975. As a Captain, Taher escaped from Pakistan during mid-July with three other fellow officers and successfully made contact with Indian authorities. He spent further two weeks at Dehradun, RAW HQ's, for debriefing and then sent to BDF HQ at Calcutta. With orders from 8 Theatre Rd., he reported to BDF Sector Commander Major Ziaur Rahman who officially appointed him 2nd Sub-Sector Commander of the 11th Sector at Mahendraganj. On 10 October 1971, Major Shafaat Jamil under interim orders from Major Zia transferred command of Sector 11 to Taher temporarily. Just only 22 days later, Taher lost his leg from a grenade blast on 2 November and flown to Pune, India, for treatment. Squadron Leader M. Hamidullah Khan officially took command of BDF Sector 11 under authority of the Direct Order Transfer of Command from the Emergency Action Message tele-wired from Bangladesh Government interim HQ at 8, Theatre Rd. Calcutta. On 21 November 1971, Major Taher received a medical board release from military service. He was temporarily reinstated in April 1972 in the Bangladesh Army and was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel.

Early life and education

Lieutenant Colonel Abu Taher was born in Badarpur, Assam Province of British India on 14 November 1938. He is from Kazla village in Purbadhala in Netrokona District of Bangladesh which is his ancestral home. After completion of higher secondary school from Sylhet M C College, he joined the Pakistan Army in September 1960 as an officer candidate.^[1] It is falsely claimed that Taher took a degree from the Institute of Social Welfare and Research of the University of Dhaka, even though there are no records of admission, courses taken or completion.

Military career

Abu Taher received his Commission in 1962 as a second lieutenant in the Pakistan Army. Abu Taher joined the elite Special Services Group (Commando Force) in 1965. Following his training, he participated in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 in the Sialkot sector of Kashmir. For his part, he received a war participation medal from the Pakistan Army. After the war, Taher took officers pre qualification course on Guerrilla Warfare at Fort Benning in the United States in 1969. He was posted to the Quetta Staff College, Pakistan in 1970.^[1]

Role in Bangladesh Liberation War

Towards the end of July 1971, Capt. Taher along with three other Bengali officers: Maj. Abul Manzoor, Capt. Dalim and Capt. Ziauddin defected from the Pakistan Army and crossed over the border near Abbottabad, West Pakistan, into India.^[1] After two weeks under Indian intelligence screening and debriefing, he was sent to BDF HQ at 8 Theatre Road. He was promoted to Major and posted to Sector 11 under Major Ziaur Rahman at Teldhala. Sector 11 was located across the Rangpur District, which comprised Mymensingh District, Tangail District and parts of the Rangpur District.
After his arrival there, Major Ziaur Rahman appointed him Sub-Sector commander of the second sub-sector at Mahendraganj towards end of August. At departure with Z-Force towards Sylhet sector on 10 October 1971, under orders from Major Zia, Major Shafaat Jamil temporarily placed command of Sector 11 to Major Taher. After 22 days on 2 November 1971, Taher lost his leg from a grenade blast injury. Squadron Leader M. Hamidullah Khan was officially appointed Sector Commander of Sector 11 under direct orders from Colonel Osmani, BDF HQ. Taher was flown to Pune, India. On 21 November Taher received a Medical Board Release. His leg was later amputated there, where he remained until February 1972. For his valour, he was awarded Bir Uttam.

Post-liberation activities

Following his return, Taher was reinstated into Bangladesh Army in April due to the severe shortage of personnel, as many remained stranded in Pakistan, where most were interned as prisoners of war. He was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and was appointed as the "Adjutant General" of BD army, in June 1972 he was appointed as Commander of 44th Brigade at the Comilla Cantonment.^[1] Due to his left-leaning communist ideas of organising and reforming the Bangladesh Army along the model of the Chinese army, he resigned from the Bangladesh Army and joined Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (National Socialist Party).^[2] As Abu Taher's ideas of a social revolution with a central communist army grew, a mutiny rebellion occurred on 3 November 1975 among senior officers and field unit commanders in the army, against those in charge since Sheikh Mujib's assassination in 15 August. Taher quickly took advantage of this, exacerbating dissent among ranking Non-Commissioned Officers and regular soldiers.^[2] Abu Taher incited and organised a socialist uprising of the soldiers on 7 November 1975. Some revenge killings took place of a number of military officers and their wives due incidents dating back to injustices that occurred during the independence war in 1971. Acts of treason and clear serious breach of military discipline and morale followed. Former Army chief of Staff, Major General Ziaur Rahman, who was released from house arrest by soldiers of 2nd Field Artillery Regiment worked to bring down the acts of treason and mutiny. Taher's actual intentions revealed further and he threatened to further instigate instability until his demands were met. Members of the army and their families demanded justice which was inevitable to bring back discipline and morale.
Once Zia retook charge of the Army, he promised stability and ordered Lt. Col. Abu Taher, BD Army(Retd.) be arrested for charges of high treason and murder on 24 November 1975. Taher was tried by a military tribunal inside the Dhaka Central Jail and was sentenced to death. He was executed by hanging on 21 July 1976. The established myth, that Taher drove to Zia's Cantonment resident and released Zia from house arrest and restored Zia to power. Once Zia brought the chaotic situation under total control, drove to the Radio Station and declared over the radio waves regarding the situation of the country and brought it to calm restoring law and order.

Mohammad Abdul Jalil ( M. A. Jalil) was the commander of the Sector 9 during Bangladesh War of Liberation in 1971.

Early years

Mohammad Abdul Jalil was born at Wazirpur in Barisal District on 9 February 1942. He passed the matriculation examination from Wazirpur WB Union Institution in 1959, IA examination from Murry Young Cadet Institution, and joined the Pakistan army as trainee officer in 1962. He obtained his graduation and M A in History during his service in the army. M. A. Jalil was promoted to the post of Captain in 1965, and was elevated to the position of Major in 1970. In February 1971, Major Jalil came to Barisal on leave from his place of posting in Multan, and joined the war of liberation in March.

War of Liberation (1971)

He was appointed commander of the Sector 9. He was, however, removed from the position in the month of November.

After independence

Major Jalil had pioneering role in floating the new political party Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal (JSD) in October 1972. At the inception of the party he was the joint convener, and was elected chairman of the party in the council session held on 26 December 1972.
The JSD under his leadership endeavored to establish 'scientific socialism' in the country and was altogether active in anti-government politics. Major Jalil contested from seven constituencies in the Jatiya Sangsad elections in 1973 with no return. Major Jalil was arrested while launching a program of the party activists to besiege the official residence of the then Home Minister on 17 March 1974. He was released on 8 November 1975. Major Jalil was again arrested on 25 November by the martial law government for his alleged conspiracy for the overthrow of the government and attempts at usurping the state power. He was sentenced to life imprisonment in a trial by the special military tribunal. He was, however, released on 24 March 1980.
Major Jalil contested in the presidential election in 1981 as a nominee of the three-party alliance of JSD, Workers Party and Krishak-Sramik Samajbadi Dal. He was removed from chairmanship of the JSD in 1984.^[2]

Grave of Major Mohammad Abdul Jalil

Notable Works

Seemahin Samay (1976)
Dristibhangi O Jiban Darshan
Surjodoy (1982)
Arakshita Swadhinatayi Paradhinata (1989)
Bangladesh Nationalist Movement for Unity: A Historical Necessity.
Claim Hasina In Bangladesh.

Death and legacy

He died at Islamabad in Pakistan on 19 November 1989. A bridge in Barisal is named after him.^[3]

Tajuddin Ahmad (Bengali: তাজউদ্দীন আহমদ) (July 23, 1925 – November 3, 1975) was a Bangladeshi statesman and freedom fighter. He served as the first Prime Minister of Bangladesh and lead the wartime Provisional Government during the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971. Ahmad is regarded as one of the most influential and instrumental figures in the birth of Bangladesh, due to his leadership of the provisional government in 1971, in which he united the various political, military and cultural forces of Bangladeshi nationalism.
A close confidante of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Ahmad was the General Secretary of the Awami League in the late 1960s and early 1970s. He coordinated the League’s election campaign for the Pakistani general election, 1970, in which the League gained a historic parliamentary majority to form government. Ahmad, along with Mujib and Dr. Kamal Hossain, led negotiations with President Yahya Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto for the transfer of power to the elected National Assembly.
After the Pakistan Army launched Operation Searchlight against Bengali nationalists in March 1971, Ahmad made his way into neighbouring India, upon the instructions of Sheikh Mujib (who was detained by Pakistani forces). As war erupted across East Pakistan, Ahmad sought the alliance of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in the fight for Bangladesh's independence. Along with senior Bengali political and military leaders, he formed the first Government of Bangladesh in Meherpur in April 1971, in which he was made Prime Minister. The war administration subsequently moved to Calcutta as a government-in-exile. Under his premiership, Ahmad presided over the creation of the Bangladesh Forces; and the majority of Bengali bureaucrats, diplomats and military officers serving Pakistan defected to the new Government of Bangladesh. He was a key figure in supervising and mandating war efforts; and initiated numerous diplomatic and cultural missions which toured world capitals advocating the Bangladesh cause. Ahmad would regularly visit the liberated regions of Bangladesh and inspire the Mukti Bahini and other freedom fighters to vigorously pursue the struggle.
After the liberation of Bangladesh, Ahmad became Finance Minister in the Mujib government in 1972. He resigned from the cabinet in 1974 and fell out with Mujib over the creation of the one-party system of BAKSAL. After the Mujib assassination in August 1975, Ahmad was arrested by the martial law government. Along with four other top League leaders, he was executed by members of the military in Dhaka Central Jail on 4 November 1975.
Ahmad is one of modern Bangladesh's most respected political figures. His wife Begum Zohra Tajuddin headed the Awami League from 1975 to 1981. His son Tanjim Ahmad was the Minister of State for Home Affairs in the Sheikh Hasina cabinet in 2009, however he resigned after just a year in office. Ahmed's second daughter Simeen Hussain was elected as a Member of Parliament from the League in 2012.^[1]^[2]^[1]

Early life

Family

Tajuddin was born in a middle class conservative Muslim family to father Moulavi Muhammad Yasin Khan and mother Meherunnesa Khanam. He had nine siblings— three brothers and six sisters. He is survived by his wife Syeda Zohra Tajuddin, 3 daughters Sharmin Ahmad (Reepi), Simeen Hussain (Rimi), Mahjabin Ahmad (Mimi) and only son Tanjim Ahmad Sohel Taj.^[3]

Political career

Ahmad organized protests and other activities during the Language Movement of 1952. He was arrested by police and imprisoned for several months.^{[citation needed]} After his release, he was elected to the East Pakistan Provincial Assembly in 1954 but was arrested following the dismissal of the A. K. Fazlul Huq-led government. He would be arrested again following the imposition of martial law by Ayub Khan in 1958 after taking power in a military coup. Ahmed worked in the pro-democracy campaign led by the Awami League and other political parties in Pakistan. He organized protests against the arrest of Mujib in 1966 on charges of sedition.^{[citation needed]} He participated at the round table conference in Rawalpindi convened by Ayub Khan to resolve the crisis between the government and the opposition parties. Following the restoration of democracy, he was elected member of the National Assembly of Pakistan in 1970.^{[citation needed]}
Following the arrest of Mujib on March 25, 1971 by the Pakistan Army, which continued to kill civilians^{[citation needed]}, Ahmad organized a government-in-exile popularly known as the Mujibnagar government to win his nation freedom. Ahmad named the capital Mujibnagar, after Shaikh Mujibur Rahman. The oath taking ceremony of the first government of Bangladesh took place on the soil of Bangladesh, in Meherpur, Kushtia on April 17, 1971. He presided over the significant Bangladesh Sector Commanders Conference 1971 that created and formed the entire Bangladesh Forces under the command of General M. A. G. Osmani. As the first Prime Minister he led efforts to organize a guerilla insurgency of Bengali civilians and armed forces and win international support. During this period, Ahmad encountered vehement intra party strife led by Khandokar Mushataq Ahmad who conspired to harm the national struggle for independence through a failed attempt to form a confederacy with Pakistan. Among Ahmad's great diplomatic achievements were to win international support and recognition of Bangladesh as a sovereign nation by the government of India. After the independence of Bangladesh, Ahmad returned to Dhaka on 22 December 1971. In the subsequent cabinet formed under Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Ahmad was given charge of the ministries of finance and planning. He was also appointed member of the committee in charge of writing the Constitution of Bangladesh. However, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was influenced to question the integrity of Tajuddin for the party and for himself by the parties within the Awami League who were proved redundant during the Liberation war. Tajuddin was widely publicized by them to be a stooge of the neighbouring Indian government probably because of the respect he commanded from Mrs Gandhi, the then prime minister of India and also for his declared gratefulness for the assistance that India gave during the war. The sycophants of Mujib also portrayed Tajuddin as aspiring to be the next Prime Minister of the country. Khondokar Mushtaque who was a pro-Pakistan conspirator during the war led the effort to malign Mr. Tajuddin. He had active support from the student leadership who also had contempt for Tajuddin as they too were restrained by him from taking advantage of the situation during the war. Till today Awami League failed to evaluate Tajuddin Ahmad's role.

Assassination

In 1974 Ahmad lost his cabinet post.^[4] When Mujib assumed the title of President and banned other political parties in 1975, Ahmad became the odd man out,^[4] declining and opposing the formation of a one-party system known as BAKSAL. When Mujib was assassinated by a group of army officers on 15 August 1975, Ahmad was immediately placed under house arrest.^[1] On August 22, he was arrested with other political leaders by the regime of the new president Khondaker Mostaq Ahmed and imprisoned at the Dhaka Central Jail. On November 3, in what became infamously known as the "Jail Killing Day",^[5] Ahmad along with Syed Nazrul Islam, A. H. M. Qamaruzzaman and Muhammad Mansur Ali were killed at midnight by a group of army officers on the instruction of President Khondaker Mostaq Ahmed. ^[6]
The release on March 25, 2007 of a documentary, Tajuddin Ahmad: An Unsung Hero (directed by Tanvir Mokammel), reflects a growing interest in the life and works of Ahmad.

Pages

Bangladesh War of Independence, 1971

Contents

Early life and education

Military career

British Indian Army 1941 - 1947

Career in the Pakistani Army

Joining the Infantry Arm

Tour of duty in East Pakistan (1950–1956)

Last post: Staff Officer GHQ Pakistan

Bengali soldier recruitment bottleneck

Role in the 1965 War

Retirement and continued influence

Entry into politics

Awami League Candidate

Leadership during Bangladesh War of Independence

Planned Preemptive Strike

Role in Bangladesh Liberation War

Meetings at Teliapara

Initial Activities as the Commander-in-Chief

Indian involvement

Rebuilding the Bangladesh Force (BDF)

Resignation

Strategy for the Campaign

The initial Strategy (July - September 1971)

Two ways to skin a cat

Action and Reaction: June - September 1971

The Monsoon Offensive

Silver Linings among dark clouds

The one two punch

Effectiveness and Importance

Osmani as C-in-C: Leadership style

Controversial Issues

Issues regarding Mujib Bahini

Absence in the December 16 Surrender Ceremony

Liberation War Medals

General of Bangladesh Army

Sector Commander Conference January 2–11, 1972

Disturbance at Pilkhana

Bangladesh Army Structure

Civilian Cabinet Minister

First Army Chief of Staff in Independent Bangladesh

Cadet College Crisis

Lt. General Wasiuddin

Resignation from Cabinet

Presidential Defense Adviser

The Jatiya Janata Party

Personal life

Death

Legacy

Contents

Early life and army career

Bangladesh Forces Commander in the Liberation War

Coup of 1975

Assassination

Contents

Family, early life and education

Air Force Career

Bangladesh War of Independence

Post Independence

Political career

Death

Contents

Early life

Role in assassination of Ziaur Rahman

Capture and death

Trial

Family and legacy

Contents

Bangladesh forces

Chief of Army Staff

Contents

Early life

Role in Bangladesh Liberation War

Bangladesh Army

Death

Family

Contents

Early life and education

Military career